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“IF YOU KNEW HIM LIKE I DID,
YOU’D HAVE SHOT HIM, TOO . . .”
A SURVEY OF ALASKA’S LAW OF
SELF-DEFENSE
JAMES FAYETTE*
Self-defense is one of the most powerful defense tools in Alaska’s
criminal law. It has the potential for broad application, it involves
numerous substantive and procedural nuances, and it implicates
many of the fundamental policies of the criminal justice system.
Moreover, Alaska’s law of self-defense has recently undergone
major revisions, making a survey of its principles both important
and timely. This Article seeks to provide a descriptive overview of
the statutes, cases, and policies that form the framework of
Alaska’s self-defense law. It is organized around the litigation
process and describes the important aspects of a self-defense claim
both before and during trial. Drawing on his experience in
litigating self-defense cases in Alaska, the author offers practical
summations and explanations that will help illuminate self-defense
principles for prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges alike.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Domestic violence and street crime prosecution are the breadand-butter of any Alaska prosecutor’s or public defender’s office.
Consequentially, self-defense principles haunt the Alaska criminal
bar’s daily practice. However, litigants and judges are often illprepared to contend with the unique substantive and evidentiary
issues that every self-defense trial raises. This Article seeks to aid
the criminal bar by providing a practical overview of Alaska’s law
of self-defense.
Part II discusses the statutory framework of self-defense, and
Part III discusses several procedural aspects of the self-defense
doctrine. Part IV addresses the most essential and commonlylitigated aspects of a self-defense claim. Part V provides an
overview of the use of prior bad acts and reputation evidence, both
for the defendant and the victim. Part VI examines four statutory
justification defenses closely related to self-defense.
This survey is intended to be a practitioner’s guide, and, as
such, it provides commentary on recent legislative trends and
1
includes citations to jury instructions and unpublished opinions.
Aside from a few practical suggestions, no normative argument is

1. The Alaska Court of Appeals has held that litigants may cite unpublished
opinions for “whatever persuasive power” the opinion may hold, but not as
binding precedent. McCoy v. State, 80 P.3d 757, 764 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002)
(interpreting ALASKA R. APP. P. 214). The unpublished opinions discussed herein
are offered in that light.
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presented.2
While this survey was originally written by a
prosecutor for prosecutors, and retains a prosecutorial focus, there
is much authority of use to defenders here. Thus, this survey is
offered to the entire Alaska criminal bar prosecutors and
defenders alike in the spirit that all our criminal jury work will
benefit.
II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
In Alaska, self-defense is a justification defense, and as such it
provides a complete defense to all crimes involving the use of
3
force. Alaska’s current self-defense statutes were enacted by the
4
1978 Alaska legislature. Since their effective date, Alaska’s two
basic self-defense statutes have been substantively amended only
5
twice—in 2004 and 2006. The statutory framework establishes
when the use of both non-deadly and deadly force is justified and
also sets forward which party will have the burden of proof at trial.
A. The Use of Non-deadly Force
Alaska’s self-defense statute provides that a defendant “is
justified in using non-deadly force . . . to the extent the person
reasonably believes that force is necessary for self-defense against
what the person reasonably believes to be unlawful force” applied
6
However, a person may not use force if the
against him.
defendant: (a) provoked the conflict with the intention of injuring
the victim, (b) was engaged in mutual combat, (c) was the first
aggressor, or (d) was using a deadly weapon or dangerous
7
instrument to act in revenge or to further a felony objective. The
first three restrictions (mutual combat, provocation, first aggressor)
do not apply “if that person has withdrawn from the encounter and
effectively communicated the withdrawal to the other person, but

2. Any opinions that are expressed in this Article are those of the author.
This Article is not an expression of the policy of the Criminal Division of the State
of Alaska, Department of Law.
3. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.81.330–.335 (2004), amended by Act effective
Sept. 13, 2006, ch. 68, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws; see also Savok v. State, No. A5669, 1996 WL 33686458, at *3 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 21, 1996) (“self-defense [is]
a complete defense to criminal responsibility . . .”).
4. Act effective 1978, ch. 166, § 10, 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws (codified at
ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.81.330–.335 (2004)).
5. Act effective Sept. 13, 2006, ch. 68, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws; Act
effective July 1, 2004, ch. 124, § 17, 2004 Alaska Sess. Laws.
6. § 11.81.330(a).
7. Id.
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the other person persists in continuing the incident by the use of
unlawful force.”8
Alaska’s non-deadly self-defense statute includes ten
important limitations. Five concepts are found in the statute’s first
clause, and five are found in the second clause. The statute’s first
clause includes the following limiting concepts: the use of excessive
force, the threat of unlawful and imminent force, as well as
9
subjective and objective necessity.
For instance, the non-deadly force statute explicitly states that
10
The
the defendant must be reacting to “unlawful force.”
requirement of an “imminent” threat is inherent in the statutory
11
definition of “force.” The statute’s “when and to the extent”
clause implicitly embodies the concept that force may not be
12
excessive. However, the “reasonably believes” clause is the heart
13
of the self-defense statute. This clause embodies two important
14
The subjective prong
tests: subjective and objective necessity.
asks the jury to assess why the defendant believed he should use
15
force against his victim. In other words, what was the defendant
actually thinking? If the defendant used force because he thought
it was necessary to avoid injury to himself, then the defendant may
16
have a self-defense claim. On the other hand, if the defendant
was motivated by anger, rage, jealousy, intoxication, or his own
17
violent nature, then he may not.
Next, the jury must assess whether the defendant’s conduct
was objectively necessary. The objective standard is “whether a
reasonable person would have acted in self-defense under the
18
circumstances.” “[T]he law holds a defendant to a standard of

8. § 11.81.330(b).
9. § 11.81.330(a).
10. Id.
11. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(27) (2005), amended by Act effective
Sept. 14, 2006, ch. 73, § 6, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws.
12. See § 11.81.330(a); see also State v. Walker, 887 P.2d 971, 978 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1994).
13. This phrase is repeated twice in Alaska’s non-deadly force statute, see §
11.81.330(a), and once again in its deadly force statute, see § 11.81.335.
14. Weston v. State, 682 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Alaska 1984).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1122.
17. See Ambrose v. State, No. A-5112, 1996 WL 341743, at *3 (Alaska Ct.
App. May 22, 1996) (affirming the defendant’s conviction in a judge-tried case
where the judge concluded that the defendant killed out of anger, not fear).
18. Weston, 682 P.2d at 1121.
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fully reasonable conduct in the context of self-defense. . . .”19 If the
defendant’s conduct does not fall within the range of conduct
which the jury is prepared to justify, then the defendant may be
20
convicted—no matter what his subjective motivation. Thus, every
self-defense trial asks the jury to place the “reasonable man” in the
defendant’s shoes and to engage in an after-the-fact assessment of
21
the reasonableness of his use of force.
The statute’s second clause includes five important instances
22
when a defendant may not claim self-defense. The first three are
when the force was the product of mutual combat, when the
defendant provoked the conflict with the intent to injure his victim,
23
and when the defendant was the first aggressor. The 2004 Alaska
legislature provided a fourth exception: a person may not claim
self-defense if the force used was the result of using a deadly
24
25
weapon or in commission of a felony criminal objective or by a

19. Savok v. State, No. A-5669, 1996 WL 33686458, at *3 (Alaska Ct. App.
Feb. 21, 1996) (describing self-defense as “a complete defense to criminal
responsibility”).
20. See Weston, 682 P.2d at 1121.
21. See id.
22. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.330(a) (2004), amended by Act effective Sept. 13,
2006, ch. 68, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws. No Alaska case has addressed whether
the jury must unanimously agree on which of these five propositions the
prosecution has disproved beyond a reasonable doubt. However, there is
persuasive authority suggesting that the jury need not do so. See State v. James,
698 P.2d 1161, 1165 (Alaska 1985). In James, the Alaska Supreme Court held that
jurors need not reach unanimous agreement on the particular theory of the
offense by which the defendant violated a criminal statute. Id. (“Alaska Rule of
Criminal Procedure 31(a) should be interpreted to require only that a jury be
unanimous in its conclusion that the defendant committed a single offense
described in the statute.”). The court reasoned that “requiring semantic
uniformity [would] encourage overcomplicated instructions and hung juries in
cases in which the jurors actually agree upon the defendant’s guilt . . . .” Id. It
would follow that a jury need not unanimously agree on why a defendant’s selfdefense claim fails.
23. §§ 11.81.330(a)(1)–(3).
24. The 2006 Alaska Legislature expanded this exclusion to include
“dangerous instruments.” Act effective Sept. 13, 2006, ch. 68, § 2, 2006 Alaska
Sess. Laws.
25. The exception applies if the force was the result of “any felony criminal
objective” of the person, whether the person acted alone or with others. §
11.81.330(a)(4)(A). The statute was drafted in this manner to avoid the problems
associated with proving formal “gang” activity. See Bill Review Letter from
Gregg D. Renkes, Attorney Gen. of Alaska, to Frank Murkowski, Governor of
Alaska (June 10, 2004).
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participant in a controlled substances offense.26 The 2006 Alaska
Legislature enacted a fifth exception: a person may not claim selfdefense if deadly force was used in retaliation for perceived or
actual conduct if the defendant (or the person on whose behalf the
27
act was committed) has a violent reputation. These legislative
changes were intended to make it more difficult for gang members
28
and drug dealers to claim self-defense.
B. The Use of Deadly Force
“Deadly force” is defined as any force that is used under
circumstances in which the defendant knows or intends to create a
29
substantial risk of causing serious physical injury. It also includes
any act that places someone in fear of such injury by means of a
30
dangerous instrument. Alaska’s self-defense statute provides that
a person may not use deadly force unless he first satisfies the test
31
for the use of non-deadly force. Next, the person may only use
deadly force when and to the extent he reasonably believes it is
necessary to defend himself against the threat of death, serious
physical injury, kidnapping, sexual assault in the first or second
degrees, sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree, or robbery in
32
any degree. The deadly force statute also includes an important
33
exception: the obligation to retreat.
C. The Burden of Proof
In Alaska, self-defense is classified as a justification “defense”
34
that the prosecution must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt. It
35
is not an “affirmative defense.” The difference is that a defendant
must prove an affirmative defense by a preponderance of the

26. § 11.81.330(a)(4).
27. Act effective Sept. 13, 2006, ch. 68, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws.
28. Bill Review Letter from Susan Parkes, Deputy Attorney Gen. of Alaska,
to Frank Murkowski, Governor of Alaska (May 9, 2006) [hereinafter ParkesMurkowski Letter].
29. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(16) (2005), amended by Act effective Sept.
14, 2006, ch. 73, § 6, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws.
30. Id.
31. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.335(a) (2004), amended by Act effective Sept. 13,
2006, ch. 68, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws.
32. Id. The 2006 amendment added sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree
to this statute. Act effective Sept. 13, 2006, ch. 68, § 3, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws.
33. § 11.81.335(b). See also infra Part IV.C.
34. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.300 (1980).
35. Id.
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evidence.36 Because self-defense is a “defense,” once the defendant
presents “some evidence” that places self-defense at issue, the
burden falls upon the prosecution to disprove self-defense beyond
37
a reasonable doubt.
Self-defense is a complete justification defense to all crimes
38
that prohibit the use of force against another person. Where the
defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction, the jury must be
39
instructed that the prosecution bears the burden to disprove it.
Practitioners (and judges) occasionally flummox the burden of
40
proof. For instance, in Brown v. State, the court of appeals held
that the trial judge committed plain error when, without objection,
41
he instructed the jury that self-defense was an affirmative defense.
This incorrect allocation of the burden of proof was not remedied
by another jury instruction that properly, if confusingly, allocated
42
the burden to the State.
43
In Owens v. State, the defense attorney actually proposed a
self-defense instruction that erroneously stated that self-defense

36. Compare ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(2) (2005), amended by Act
effective Sept. 14, 2006, ch. 73, § 6, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws (defining an
affirmative defense), with § 11.81.900(b)(19) (defining a non-affirmative defense).
37. §§ 11.81.900(b)(19)(A)–(B). In 2003, the administration unsuccessfully
introduced legislation which would have made self-defense an affirmative defense.
Bill History, http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_bill.asp?session=23&bill=SB170
(follow “full text” hyperlink; then follow “SB 170” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 12,
2006).
38. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.330(a) (2004), amended by Act effective Sept. 13,
2006, ch. 68, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws.
39. Brown v. State, 698 P.2d 671, 674 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). However, even
if this explicit instruction is negligently omitted, a lawyer’s correct argument on
this point may cure any defect in the instruction. O’Brannon v. State, 812 P.2d
222, 228–29 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991); Allen v. State, 51 P.3d 949, 959 (Alaska Ct.
App. 2002) (holding a correct argument cured any subtle potential jury instruction
error); Hall v. State, No. A-6283, 1998 WL 90885, at *6 (Alaska Ct. App. Mar. 4,
1998) (holding that, while the court’s jury instruction packet did not expressly
state that self-defense was a complete defense, any error was cured by the lawyer’s
correct summation); Weaver v. State, No. A-7177, 2000 WL 1350600, at *5
(Alaska Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2000) (holding the failure to include a specific
instruction regarding the state’s burden to disprove was not plain error because
the jury received a general instruction which stated that “the burden of proof was
on the State and that the burden never shifted.”).
40. 698 P.2d 671 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
41. Id. at 673–75.
42. Id.
43. No. A-7952, 2002 WL 31831411 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2002).
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was an affirmative defense.44 The Owens trial judge gave the
erroneous proposed defense instruction, but the jurors actually
caught the error (another instruction in their jury packet correctly
stated that the prosecution bore the burden of disproving self45
Reversal was averted
defense beyond a reasonable doubt).
because the trial judge clarified the point in response to a jury
question, and because both attorneys properly allocated the burden
46
during summation.
The judge may not instruct the jury that “the court has
determined” that the defendant has successfully presented “some
47
The issue of
evidence” supporting a self-defense instruction.
“some evidence” is a legal matter for the court, and the judge
should not instruct the jury about why the court is giving a self48
defense instruction. To do so would constitute an intrusion into
the jury’s function and would be an instruction on an irrelevant
49
matter.
III. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE SELF-DEFENSE INSTRUCTION
There are a number of procedural nuances to self-defense
litigation. Three of the most important are: (1) whether or not the
prosecutor must instruct the grand jury on the potential use of the
defense, (2) sufficiency of the notice required to be provided by the
defense to the prosecution, and (3) what instruction, if any, should
be given if self-defense does not apply to the case.
A. Instructing the Grand Jury
Must a prosecutor instruct the grand jury on the potential for a
self-defense claim? There are two answers: the legal answer and
the practical answer. Legally, a prosecutor is not obligated to
instruct the grand jury regarding a potential defense, except where

44. Id. at *2.
45. Id.
46. Id.; but see Ambrose v. State, No. A-5112, 1995 WL 17220777, at *3
(Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 26, 1995) (holding that remand was required because the
judge made ambiguous comments that arguably and incorrectly shifted the burden
to the defendant).
47. Owens, 2002 WL 31831411, at *3; see Howell v. State, 917 P.2d 1202, 1207
(Alaska Ct. App. 1996). Howell dealt with the “heat of passion” defense rather
than self-defense, but the “some evidence” issues relating to jury instructions
remain the same.
48. Howell, 917 P.2d at 1207.
49. Id.
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such an instruction would “almost surely” result in the grand jury’s
failure to indict.50
Therefore, any error or omission in a grand jury instruction on
51
this point is probably irrelevant. In Smith v. State, the prosecutor
gave the grand jury an impromptu, and incomplete, explanation of
52
the law of self-defense. The court of appeals concluded that this
error did not require dismissal because the prosecution had no
53
obligation to instruct the grand jury on self-defense at all.
The court of appeals further noted that it was not error for the
prosecution to fail to introduce evidence which would have
54
supported a self-defense claim. In Smith, the defendant gave a
post-arrest statement that he felt the victim “had a weapon of some
55
sort.” Because “self-defense was not properly a grand jury issue
in this case,” the prosecution had no obligation to introduce this
56
statement.
From a practical perspective, however, it may be advisable to
bring the issue of self-defense before the grand jury. Alaska law
provides that a prosecutor may argue his theory of the case before
the grand jury, so long as that argument does not exceed the scope
57
There are two reasons why a
of permissible trial argument.
prosecutor should be completely open with the grand jury, read
them the self-defense statutes, and then argue why those principles
do not apply to the matter at hand. First, doing so would save the
court from resolving a pre-trial motion. Second, if a prosecutor is
unable to convince ten out of eighteen grand jurors that the case
should be charged with no opposing voice in the courtroom, then
50. Grant v. State, 621 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981) (holding that
Alaska law does not require a prosecutor to instruct the grand jury regarding a
defense unless failure to consider the defense would “almost surely” have resulted
in failure to indict); see Delolli v. State, No. A-8263, 2003 WL 22143282, at *4
(Alaska Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2003) (applying the Grant holding to self-defense
cases); see also Robles v. State, No A-6208, 1998 WL 208814, at *2 (Alaska Ct.
App. Apr. 29, 1998) (applying Grant and rejecting a challenge to the indictment
based on the prosecutor’s failure to instruct the jury on the use of force to make a
private person’s arrest); cf. Gaona v. State, 630 P.2d 534, 536–37 (Alaska Ct. App.
1981) (finding no plain error by the trial court because the case against the
defendant was strong, even though the prosecutor discouraged the grand jury
from considering self-defense and failed to instruct them on it).
51. No. A-5390, 1995 WL 17221231 (Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 9, 1995).
52. Id. at *2.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at *1.
56. Id. at *3.
57. Gustafson v. State, 854 P.2d 751, 759 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
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the prosecutor could never hope to prevail at trial with a judge and
a clever defense lawyer looking over his shoulder.
B. Notice
Alaska court rules provide that the defendant must give the
prosecution notice of his intent to claim statutory
defenses including self-defense no later than ten days prior to
58
Failure to do so “shall entitle” the prosecution to a
trial.
continuance, and the prosecutor could request preclusion of the
59
defense.
A preclusion ruling is rarely given, and judges may be
60
skeptical of a prosecutor’s last-minute request for preclusion.
Nonetheless, the defense’s failure to file formal notice of selfdefense has important consequences. A formal claim of selfdefense may change a prosecutor’s voir dire, proposed jury
instructions, and construction of his case-in-chief. As discussed in
Part V, admissibility of evidence establishing the past violent acts
and violent reputation of either the victim or the defendant is an
evidentiary issue that should be resolved prior to trial.
The court of appeals has mentioned defense failure to comply
with Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(c)(5) on several
occasions, but has never squarely affirmed a trial judge who relied
61
on the rule’s “preclusion” clause. In Rexford v. State and Barnett
62
v. State, trial judges refused requests for self-defense instructions,
in part because of failure to provide pre-trial notice required by the
63
rule. However, neither the Rexford court nor the Barnett court
64
affirmed the trial judge’s decision for this exclusive reason.
C. Instructing the Jury that Self-Defense Does Not Apply
If the court rules that self-defense does not apply to the case,
the judge may be tempted to submit the case to the jury without
mentioning a word about self-defense during jury instructions. The
court of appeals, however, has stated that “in a case such as this

58. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(c)(5).
59. Id.
60. See Grady v. State, No. A-6274, 1998 WL 208816, at *3 (Alaska Ct. App.
Apr. 29, 1998) (allowing the defendant to claim self-defense, even though the
defense provided Rule 16 notice in the middle of the defendant’s testimony rather
than before trial).
61. No. A-8539, 2004 WL 2676430 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2004).
62. No. A-7785, 2003 WL 77061 (Alaska Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2003).
63. Rexford, 2004 WL 2676430, at *3; Barnett, 2003 WL 77061, at *2.
64. Rexford, 2004 WL 2676430, at *5; Barnett, 2003 WL 77061, at *2.
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where self-defense is presented as a possible defense, there is a
danger that the jury may consider its own understanding of what
self-defense is in the absence of an instruction from the court. It
65
seems preferable to have the jury correctly instructed.”
Therefore, in a case where self-defense may have been
mentioned during voir dire, and where a judge concludes that no
self-defense instruction is warranted (perhaps due to the defense’s
failure to elicit “some evidence” of self-defense), the specter of
nullification haunts the courtroom. If the judge does not instruct
the jury that “self-defense does not apply to the case,” the jury may
substitute “its own understanding” of what self-defense law is, and
award the defendant the windfall of acquittal where he is not
entitled to it. In the experience of the author, it is best for the
judge to state affirmatively: “You are instructed as a matter of law
that the principles relating to the lawful and justified use of self66
defense do not apply to this case.”
Of course, some judges may be skeptical about instructing the
jury on a defense that does not apply. The best response to such
skepticism would emphasize three points. First, Alaska Rule of
Criminal Procedure 30(b) requires the judge to instruct the jury on
all matters necessary for the jury’s information regarding their
67
verdict. Second, while the judge, prosecutor, and defender know
that self-defense doesn’t legally apply, there is no reason to assume
that the jury understands that. Third, given the likely tenor of the
defense attorney’s voir dire, and the likelihood that jurors form
their opinion about self-defense issues from popular media, the
jurors are not only predisposed to think about self-defense, but to
do so in a legally erroneous way. Thus, it would be a miscarriage of
justice if the jury were to substitute its own judgment of what selfdefense might be, and then acquit on the basis of a defense
that unknown to the jurors the judge has ruled did not apply.
This type of nullification was the danger that the Folger court
68
recognized.
Ample Alaska authority supports an instruction removing self69
defense from the jury’s consideration.
65. Folger v. State, 648 P.2d 111, 114 n.3 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
66. The author offers this jury instruction based on his personal experience.
67. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 30(b).
68. Folger, 648 P.2d at 114 n.3.
69. See Gilbreath v. Municipality of Anchorage, 773 P.2d 218, 224 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1989) (“[W]here the trial court is not obligated to give an instruction on a
defense, it is permissible to tell the jury in an instruction that the defense is not
available; such an instruction does not violate the rule prohibiting directing a
verdict against a criminal defendant.”); Berge v. State, No. A-7142, 2000 WL
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IV. ESSENTIAL QUESTIONS ABOUT SELF-DEFENSE
Self-defense litigation poses a number of key questions,
including: (1) whether the underlying crime is a “force” crime, (2)
whether the defendant was the first aggressor, (3) whether the
defendant had a duty to retreat, (4) whether the defendant has
offered “some evidence” sufficient to merit a self-defense
instruction, (5) whether the defendant faced an imminent threat,
(6) whether the defendant feared unlawful force, (7) whether the
defendant used excessive force, and (8) whether the defendant had
a subjectively held, objectively reasonable belief in the necessity of
force. Each of these questions will be discussed in turn.
A. Is this a “Force” Crime?
70
Therefore, selfSelf-defense justifies the use of “force.”
defense is not a defense to any crime that does not criminalize the
use of force. For instance, self-defense is not a defense to evidence
tampering, burglary, false report or theft crimes. Other defenses,
71
such as necessity, may apply to such crimes, but since these are
affirmative defenses they carry different burdens of pleading and
72
proof.
In light of the force crime requirement, the prosecutor’s initial
charging decision is critical. A defendant may have a colorable
self-defense claim to an assault, but self-defense would not be a
defense, for example, to removing a weapon from a crime scene,
wiping the blood off it, hiding it, or driving drunk away from the
73
scene afterwards. None of the crimes implicated by that conduct
criminalize the use of “force.” Furthermore, where self-defense is
litigated, but self-defense principles apply only to certain counts of
the indictment, the jury should be specifically instructed that the

1058955, at *7–8 (Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2000) (affirming the trial court’s jury
instruction that the jury was not to consider self-defense under Gilbreath because
the defendant stated that he was not presenting a self-defense case).
70. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.330(a) (2004), amended by Act effective Sept. 13,
2006, ch. 68, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws (“A person is justified in using nondeadly
force . . . .”).
71. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 10.4(a), at 143
n.2 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing an example in which B, fleeing from A’s attack, steals
C’s car: “It is doubtless true that B is justified in taking C’s car, so he is not guilty
of larceny thereof, but his defense is necessity rather than self-defense.”).
72. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
73. In this example the crimes would be tampering with physical evidence and
driving while intoxicated.

01__FAYETTE.DOC

184

1/10/2007 8:47 AM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[23:171

doctrine of self-defense, if found, constitutes a defense to only
certain counts of the indictment.74
Self-defense only justifies the use of force against persons, not
75
76
against objects. In the colorful case of McGee v. State, the court
of appeals sided with this traditional view in dicta. McGee found
77
After an
his mother having sex with Wesley Alexander.
altercation, Alexander told McGee that he would “run [his] punk
78
ass over.” McGee went outside, found a shovel, and smashed out
79
the windows of Alexander’s truck. McGee was later charged with
80
criminal mischief for damaging someone else’s property.
At trial, McGee testified that he damaged the truck in self81
defense to prevent Alexander from attacking him. The trial judge
ruled that self-defense was not a potential defense to the criminal
82
mischief charge, but that necessity was. The court of appeals
noted that, consistent with the traditional view, Alaska’s selfdefense statute justifies use of force upon another person, but not
83
upon an object. The court decided the case on other grounds,
however, affirming McGee’s conviction because he did not face an
84
“imminent” threat of physical injury.
B. Was the Defendant the First Aggressor?
If undisputed evidence establishes that the defendant was the
initial aggressor, the court may properly deny a self-defense
85
instruction. It is a “well-established rule of law” that an aggressor
cannot claim self-defense unless he has begun an encounter with
74. See Baker v. State, No. A-5198, 1995 WL 17220761, at *3 n.3 (Alaska Ct.
App. Apr. 5, 1995) (“Because the defense of self-defense relates to the fourthdegree assault charge, the court’s failure to instruct on self-defense could have had
no effect on the jury’s verdict on the burglary charge.”); Caldwell v. State, No. A3333, 1991 WL 11259199, at *3 n.2 (Alaska Ct. App. July 31, 1991) (holding that,
while the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s self-defense claim to the
charge of assault, the “self-defense claim has no bearing on the charge of criminal
mischief”).
75. McGee v. State, 95 P.3d 945, 947 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004).
76. 95 P.3d 945 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004).
77. Id. at 946.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 946–47.
83. Id. at 947 (citing LAFAVE, supra note 71, at 143).
84. Id.
85. Gray v. State, 463 P.2d 897, 908 (Alaska 1970) (citing 4 WARREN ON
HOMICIDE § 338 (perm. ed. 1938)).
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non-deadly force but is met with deadly force, or if he has
effectively withdrawn from the encounter and the initial “victim”
86
continues the assault.
According to Judge Singleton, “[u]nder this court’s view, only
the person who fires the first shot, strikes the first blow, or speaks
87
The
the first insult can be deemed an initial aggressor . . . .”
supreme court set forth the rationale for this rule in the following
way:
We are satisfied that in a day of increasing resort to violence
these are salutary rules indeed. The law of self-defense is
designed to afford protection to one who is beset by an aggressor
and confronted by a necessity not of his own making. It must
not be so perverted as to justify a homicide which occurs in the
course of a dispute provoked by the defendant at a time when he
knows or ought reasonably to know that the encounter will
result in mortal combat.
....
. . . The law cannot give its88sanction to the settling of disputes by
the use of deadly weapons.

The identity of the initial aggressor usually presents a classic jury
89
issue. As such, a variety of cases are offered below to illustrate
90
whether a defendant’s actions make him the first aggressor.
In its most obvious incarnation, individuals committing violent
91
felonies are usually deemed to be the first aggressor. In Rhames
86. Castillo v. State, 614 P.2d 756, 766 (Alaska 1980).
87. Klumb v. State, 712 P.2d 909, 913 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986) (Singleton J.,
concurring and dissenting). Judge Singleton then criticized this rule as being
unnecessarily narrow. See id.
88. Bangs v. State, 608 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska 1980) (quoting State v. Millett, 273
A.2d 504, 510 (Me. 1971)).
89. Brown v. State, 698 P.2d 671, 673–74 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
90. Two important cases, McMahan v. State, 617 P.2d 494, 501–02 (Alaska
1980), and Bangs v. State, 608 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska 1980), also bear on whether the
defendant was the first aggressor. See infra Part IV.D.3.b.
91. See, e.g., Loesche v. State, 620 P.2d 646, 651 (Alaska 1980); Krantz v.
State, No. A-1831, 1989 WL 1594942, at *1–4 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 26, 1989).
Krantz was convicted of third-degree assault for entering an apartment and
brandishing a shotgun at the occupants. Krantz, 1989 WL 1594942, at *1. Krantz
testified that he had been previously threatened by a man named “Michael,” and
he mistakenly thought that Michael lived in the apartment. Id. In fact, Michael
did not live there and Krantz’s assault was aimed at two innocent bystanders. Id.
The court of appeals rejected Krantz’s theory of self-defense because he had
armed himself and openly brandished the shotgun upon entering the apartment.
Id. at *3–4. The court of appeals distinguished Klumb and Brown, noting that
neither Klumb nor Brown brandished his weapon until confronted. Id. at *4.
“Nothing in Klumb or Brown suggests that an individual is entitled to openly carry
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v. State,92 the court of appeals held that Rhames was not entitled to
93
a self-defense instruction where he was clearly the first aggressor.
Rhames, upon hearing that his estranged wife Carrie had obtained
a restraining order against him, drove to the apartment Carrie was
94
visiting. Upon seeing Rhames, Carrie retrieved a .22 caliber pistol
95
While outside,
and gave it to the apartment owner, Patrick.
Rhames retrieved a .38 caliber revolver and fired at the
96
He then broke into the apartment through the
apartment.
window, fired four more shots at Carrie and Patrick, and then
struck Patrick repeatedly with the revolver when it failed, before
97
Rhames argued that he should have been
finally escaping.
provided with a jury instruction of self-defense because he
conceivably could have seen Carrie hand Patrick the gun, making
98
Rhames think he had to defend himself. The court of appeals
upheld the ruling of the superior court, finding that because
Rhames was the initial aggressor, self-defense was not an available
99
defense for his actions.
The defendant may be the first aggressor even if he is
responding to the victim’s somewhat confrontational act. In
100
Desjardins v. State, the defendant was driving a pickup truck and
101
One of the
passed some hitchhikers without stopping.
hitchhikers kicked his truck, which prompted Desjardins to stop
102
and pursue the hitchhikers on foot. An affray followed, and the
victim was struck with an implement, resulting in a skull fracture
103
and brain injury that caused death. Police later found an iron rod
104
in the back of the defendant’s truck. Desjardins testified that he
struggled with the victim but denied striking him with the iron
105
rod. The trial court denied Desjardins’s request for a self-defense
a firearm to a hostile confrontation in order to prospectively discourage assaultive
conduct by a potential rival.” Id. at *4.
92. 907 P.2d 21 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
93. Id. at 25–26.
94. Id. at 23.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 23–24.
98. Id. at 25.
99. Id. The court also reasoned that he unquestionably could have retreated.
Id. at 26. See also infra Part IV.C.
100. 551 P.2d 181 (Alaska 1976).
101. Id. at 183.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 183–84.
104. Id. at 184.
105. Id.
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instruction: “There is no indication that Desjardins acted in selfdefense; [the victim] did not make an aggressive move toward him
106
but instead fled, until he was knocked down.” Because there was
no evidence that the victim offered resistance, Desjardins was not
107
entitled to a self-defense instruction.
Even where the defendant is reacting to racial taunts, he may
108
still be the first aggressor. In Logan v. State, the defendant, who
was African-American, was on a team that lost a summer
109
basketball game to several white men. One of the victors taunted
Logan with racial insults, such as “you guys got schooled by a
110
Logan punched the taunter in the face,
bunch of white boys.”
111
making the first physical contact. Another member of the white
team, Sherburne, jumped in, grabbed Logan, and pulled him to the
112
ground. Bystanders broke up the fight and asked Logan to leave,
113
but Logan instead retrieved a gun from his car. He returned to
the group, pointed the gun at Sherburne, and asked him how it
114
Then Sherburne’s friend, Waterson,
would feel to be shot.
115
rushed Logan and tried to tackle him. In the struggle, Logan shot
116
Waterson twice, killing him. Logan argued self-defense at trial,
but the trial judge ruled that Logan was not entitled to a selfdefense instruction because Logan was the initial aggressor “under
everyone’s version of [the] confrontation” and because he had not
117
communicated his withdrawal from the encounter. The court of
118
appeals affirmed.
106. Id. at 189.
107. Id.
108. No. A-8447, 2004 WL 1837674 (Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2004).
109. Id. at *1.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at *3. See also ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.330(b) (2004), amended by Act
effective Sept. 13, 2006, ch. 68, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws. Logan is one of the
few Alaska “withdrawal” opinions. The court of appeals surveyed sister state
cases and noted that these cases have held that where the defendant points a gun
at a victim and then lowers it, or backs off (as if to retreat) but keeps the gun
trained on the victim, he has not “effectively communicated withdrawal” so as to
be entitled to a self-defense instruction. Logan, 2004 WL 1837674, at *5. Another
rare “withdrawal” case is Robinson v. City & Borough of Juneau, No. A-4171,
1992 WL 12153229 (Alaska Ct. App. July 22, 1992). Robinson was prosecuted for
throwing a snowball at another man without provocation and then, a few minutes
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On the other hand, even defendants who start out with illegal
intent may be entitled to a self-defense instruction. In Toomey v.
119
State, the defendant was thrown out of a bar, and then stole a car
that was idling in the parking lot, went to his brother’s house to
120
retrieve a gun, and came back to the bar. When he arrived in the
parking lot, the car owner and two friends confronted Toomey, one
121
of them brandishing a pool cue. Toomey pointed the gun at the
122
man, told him to “hold it,” jumped in the car, and drove away.
He was arrested forty-five minutes later, asleep in a restaurant
123
Toomey was charged with robbery, and he argued
parking lot.
124
The supreme court held that Toomey was
self-defense at trial.
entitled to have his jury instructed on self-defense because a
reasonable juror could have concluded that Toomey had
abandoned his illegal intent when he took the car for a second
125
time. The court reasoned that a juror could have concluded that
126
Thus, a
Toomey felt reasonable fear of attack by the group.
badly split supreme court (three-to-two, with three opinions from

later, punching him. Id. at *1. The victim was the fiancé of Robinson’s former
girlfriend. Id. At trial, Robinson argued that he had withdrawn from his
unprovoked initial snowball assault and that he was entitled to punch the victim in
self-defense after the victim aggressively rose to approach him. Id. The defense
proposed an instruction on “withdrawal” which tracked the statutory language of
section 11.81.330(b). Id. The trial judge denied the request. Id. Instead, the
court instructed the jury that the defendant “was the initial aggressor,” and was
therefore disqualified from claiming self-defense at all. Id. The court of appeals
reversed, citing Folger v. State, 648 P.2d 111 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). Robinson,
1992 WL 12153229, at *2.
118. The court also reasoned that Logan was not entitled to a self-defense
instruction because Waterson’s use of force was “lawful.” Logan, 2004 WL
1837674, at *6. Because Logan had committed a felony assault upon Sherburne
(pointing the gun at him), Waterson was authorized to use force against Logan to
keep him from leaving. Id.; see also ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.390 (1978) (allowing
the use of force to make a private person’s arrest). Therefore, Logan did not
reasonably perceive the use of “unlawful” force against him, as required by
section 11.81.330(a). Logan, 2004 WL 12153229, at *6.
119. 581 P.2d 1124 (Alaska 1978).
120. Id. at 1125.
121. Id. at 1125–26.
122. Id. at 1126.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1127.
126. Id. at 1126.
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five judges) held that even car thieves may be entitled to assert
self-defense.127
C. Did the Defendant Have a Duty to Retreat?
Alaska’s deadly force statute requires individuals to retreat in
128
Before the 2006 amendment, only peace
certain circumstances.
officers and the owners of premises were exempt from the duty to
129
retreat. Others were required to retreat only if they could do so
130
with “complete safety” to themselves and to others. In 2006, the
Alaska legislature expanded the exemption, including all residents
of the premises where the force was used, the owner’s or resident’s

127. Id. at 1124. Toomey’s outcome would almost certainly have been different
under the current statute. Toomey would now be disqualified from a self-defense
instruction because he used a deadly weapon to further his felony criminal
objective (felony vehicle theft). See ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.330(a)(4)(A) (2004),
amended by Act effective Sept. 13, 2006, ch. 68, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws.
Toomey is one of the relatively few Alaska self-defense cases where the result has
been changed by the 2004 and 2006 legislative reforms. Caldwell v. State, No. A3333, 1991 WL 11259199 (Alaska Ct. App. July 31, 1991), is another case in which
the defendant would have been denied a self-defense instruction under post-2004
Alaska law. Caldwell attacked the man who owned the storage lot from which he
stole an ATV. Id. at *1. Caldwell’s theft would constitute felony vehicle theft
under post-1996 Alaska law. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.360(a)(1) (2001).
Accordingly, Caldwell would now be precluded from asserting self-defense by
section 11.81.330(a)(4)(A).
128. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.335(b) (2004), amended by Act effective Sept. 13,
2006, ch. 68, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws. In Rhames v. State, 907 P.2d 21 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1995), the court also based its refusal to grant a self-defense instruction
on the defendant’s failure to retreat: “Even assuming that Rhames looked through
the window and saw Patrick holding the .22 pistol, the fact remains that Rhames
proceeded to break into the apartment. Rhames suggests no reason why he could
not have avoided the encounter by simply refraining from breaking into the
apartment and, instead, driving away.” Id. at 26.
129. See § 11.81.335(b).
130. Id. For an example of a pre-2006 result that has been changed by the
amendment, see Stapleton v. State, 696 P.2d 180 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). In
Stapleton, the defendant shot a hotel desk clerk in the office area of a hotel where
he was a long-term tenant. Id. at 181. While Stapleton was a resident of the hotel,
he did not “own or lease” the office area itself. Id. at 184. Therefore, the court
held that the jury was properly instructed that he had a duty to retreat before
resorting to deadly force. Id. Under Alaska’s post-2006 statute, however,
Stapleton would have had no duty to retreat. See S.B. 200, 24th Leg., 2d Sess.
(Alaska 2006) (enacted) (residents have no duty to retreat).
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guests or agents, and all employees in the building where they
work.131
Several jury instructions can be gleaned from one of the most
132
interesting of Alaska’s duty-to-retreat cases, Halton v. State.
Halton and his victim, Rogers, had been antagonists for about a
133
year, harassing each other on various occasions. Halton decided
134
to arm himself with a handgun, and purposely sought out Rogers.
During the confrontation, Rogers shot at Halton, missed, and ran
135
away. Halton chased Rogers and returned fire, and Rogers’s gun
136
Halton
jammed when he attempted to shoot at Halton again.
then shot Rogers a second time from long-distance, and once
137
Eventually,
Halton caught up with him, the two men wrestled.
138
Halton stood over Rogers and shot him a final time. Rogers died
139
from the gunshot wounds.

131. S.B. 200, 24th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2006) (enacted). The 2006
amendment dealt with what was referred to as the “castle doctrine”—as in “a man
should be able to defend his castle.” See Parkes-Murkowski Letter, supra note 28.
Of course, existing Alaska law provided, and continues to provide, a separate
statutory justification defense to those in control of premises who use force to
defend themselves against burglary and criminal trespasses. ALASKA STAT. §
11.81.350(c) (1978), amended by Act effective Sept. 13, 2006, ch. 68, §§ 5–6, 2006
Alaska Sess. Laws. The 2006 legislation amended this statute only by expressly
adding “guests” to persons who claim the benefit of the statute, yet the legislature
watered down the “duty to retreat” clause by expanding the list of persons
exempted. S.B. 200, 24th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2006) (enacted). This 2006
legislative amendment was sponsored by the National Rifle Association. See
Parkes-Murkowski Letter, supra note 28. Although this election-year legislation
was probably intended to vindicate the rights of lawful gun owners, some
members of the Alaska legal community have already noted the possibility of
unintended consequences, as seen in an Anchorage Daily News editorial: “Indeed,
the more liberal self-defense proposal is welcome news for criminal defense
attorneys. Informed of the general thrust of the bill, Anchorage criminal defense
attorney Rex Lamont Butler said, half-jokingly, ‘That’s huge. When can they sign
it? . . . I’m not sure about the wisdom of it, but it certainly is going to make it
easier as a criminal defense attorney to defend certain cases.’” Editorial, Fire
Away if Threatened, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Jan. 9, 2006, at B4.
132. No. A-6379, 1998 WL 208815 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 29, 1998).
133. Id. at *1.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at *2.
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In response to an interesting series of questions posed by the
jury members,140 the trial judge instructed the jury:
A person may not use deadly force if he knows that he can with
complete safety as to 141
himself and others avoid the necessity of
doing so by retreating.
Even if he has been shot at[,] a person may not use deadly force
if he knows that he can retreat with complete safety to himself.
He can pursue the shooter if he chooses[,] but [he] may not do so
using or threatening the use of deadly force . . . .
When pursuit is allowed, the mere carrying of a handgun while
in pursuit is not prohibited. However, the use or threatened use
of a handgun is deadly force and [is] not permitted unless the
circumstances ripen into a self-defense situation as defined in the
instructions.
Please keep in mind that the duty to retreat and self-defense
142
instructions and related definitions are all interconnected.

The court of appeals approved of these instructions, concluding
that “[a] person can not automatically use deadly force while
pursuing someone who has shot at them. If they do shoot at their
fleeing assailant, the shooting must be supported by a reasonable
fear of imminent serious harm, and there must not have been an
143
obvious avenue of safe retreat.”
D. Has the Defense Offered “Some Evidence?”
A defendant must present “some evidence” on each element
144
Whether the defense has offered “some
of self-defense.
evidence” sufficient to support a jury instruction for self-defense is
145
The Alaska Supreme Court has
a matter for the trial judge.
defined “some evidence” as “evidence in light of which a
reasonable juror could have entertained a reasonable doubt” as to
146
the element in question.
140. See id.
141. Id. n.2.
142. Id. at *2.
143. Id. at *4.
144. Ha v. State, 892 P.2d 184, 190 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
145. See id. (“[A] trial judge’s obligation to instruct the jury on self-defense
arises only if there is some evidence tending to prove each element of the
defense.” (emphasis added)); Folger v. State, 648 P.2d 111, 113–14 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1982) (holding that the trial judge erred in determining that there was not
enough evidence for the self-defense issue to go to the jury).
146. LaLonde v. State, 614 P.2d 808, 810 (Alaska 1980). LaLonde dealt with
the issue of heat of passion, not self-defense, but the Alaska Court of Appeals
later cited this language approvingly in a self-defense case. See Folger, 648 P.2d at
113.
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1. “Some Evidence” Generally. Alaska law is well-settled
that the issue of “some evidence” is viewed in the light most
favorable to the defendant and without regard to the incredibility
147
or implausibility of the defense evidence. As Judge Coats wrote,
“even a weak or implausible self-defense claim is a question for the
148
jury.”
When assessing the sufficiency of “some evidence,” the
credibility of the defense evidence is generally an issue for the jury,
149
not the trial judge. Once the defendant places self-defense fairly
in play by satisfying the “some evidence” test, the trial judge may
not deny the defendant a jury trial by concluding that he does not
150
believe his witnesses.
This point has been frequently litigated in Alaska. In Lamont
151
v. State, for example, an intoxicated defendant pulled a gun on a
village public safety officer following closely behind the
152
The defendant requested, but was denied, a selfdefendant.
153
The court of appeals reversed the
defense instruction at trial.
trial court’s ruling on the self-defense instruction, holding that even
the implausible testimony of the defendant, standing alone, was
154
sufficient to ground a self-defense claim.

147. See Howell v. State, 917 P.2d 1202, 1207 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996) (“In
applying the some evidence test [to the heat of passion defense], neither the
credibility of conflicting witnesses nor the plausibility of the accused’s version is
considered. So long as some evidence is presented to support the defense, matters
of credibility are properly left for the jury.” (quoting LaPierre v. State, 734 P.2d
997, 1000 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987))); Christie v. State, 580 P.2d 310, 314–15 (Alaska
1978) (“The judgment of the trial judge as to the sufficiency of the evidence is
entitled to great weight on appeal, but, since the defendant’s burden is merely to
raise the issue, any real doubt should be resolved in his favor.” (quoting
McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1962))).
148. Folger, 648 P.2d at 113.
149. Paul v. State, 655 P.2d 772, 776 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (“[T]he court is not
called upon to determine the credibility or strength of the evidence or the weight
to be given to testimony.” (citation omitted)).
150. See id.
151. 934 P.2d 774 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
152. Id. at 776.
153. Id. at 776–77.
154. Id. at 778–79; see also Paul, 655 P.2d at 775–76 (“The burden to produce
some evidence of self-defense is not, however, a heavy one . . . . A jury question
will be presented and an instruction required if the evidence, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the accused, might arguably lead a juror to entertain a
reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.”).
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2. “Some Evidence” May Not Be Based on Sheer Speculation.
While it is true that the defendant’s “some evidence” burden is not
heavy, it is equally true that it may not be based on sheer
155
speculation and must satisfy all elements of the statutory defense.
156
For instance, in Hilbish v. State, the female murder defendant
argued that the following circumstances supported her request for
instructions on self-defense and heat of passion: that the victim was
a male, that he was larger and stronger than she, that he was angry
with her due to her affair with another man, that the two had
argued shortly before the murder, that he had threatened her in the
days before his death, and that his blood was spattered about the
157
158
house. Although she did not testify, the defendant argued that
these circumstances grounded the inference of a struggle sufficient
159
to entitle her to a self-defense instruction. The trial court denied
the self-defense instruction, and the court of appeals affirmed,
because Hilbish presented no evidence of the actual use or threat
of deadly force against her, and no evidence that she had acted
based upon a reasonable belief in her necessity to use deadly
160
force. The court of appeals concluded:
[T]he state was under no obligation to assume the burden of
disproving self-defense until there was some evidence
affirmatively suggesting that what might have happened actually
did happen . . . .
. . . Allowing the jury to consider self-defense . . . could only have
invited speculation as to possibilities
that find no reasonable
161
support in the evidence . . . .

Although the lack of evidence supporting the defendant’s claim is
the key consideration, it is also significant to note that the court of
appeals seems more likely to affirm the denial of a self-defense
instruction if the defendant did not actually testify about why he
162
used force.
3. Cases Where the Defendant was Erroneously Denied a SelfDefense Instruction. Although cases like Hilbish demonstrate that
155. See Hamilton v. State, 59 P.3d 760, 771 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
156. 891 P.2d 841 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
157. Id. at 851–52.
158. Interview with trial prosecutor (Aug. 21, 2006).
159. Hilbish, 891 P.2d at 851.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 852.
162. See, e.g., id.; Hamilton v. State, 59 P.3d 760, 770 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002);
Frank v. State, No. A-7914, 2003 WL 1987850, at *1 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 30,
2003) (affirming the trial court’s denial of a self-defense instruction in a murder
trial where the defendant did not testify).
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sheer speculation is insufficient to satisfy the “some evidence” test,
this threshold is a relatively low standard, as the following cases
illustrate. These cases also show that, as a practical matter, a
defendant who declines to testify may not provide sufficient
evidence to support a self-defense instruction (because a testifying
defendant is more likely to satisfy the “some evidence” test by
providing direct evidence of his subjective motivation to use
163
force).
a. Generally. Only a very small quantum of evidence is
164
In Folger v.
required to create a question of fact for the jury.
165
State, the defendant testified that he believed he was going to be
robbed by the physically larger victim, so he took out his knife to
scare, not stab, the victim (not knowing whether the victim had a
166
The court of appeals held that this testimony was
weapon).
sufficient to entitle the defendant to a self-defense jury instruction,
since the “some evidence” test only requires “more than a
167
scintilla.” To this end, the court explained that “[i]t is obvious
why a trial judge would be less than impressed with Folger’s
explanation for his use of a dangerous weapon. However, Folger
was entitled to a trial by a jury and a jury should have been
168
instructed on his self-defense claim.”
169
The Folger court relied heavily on Christie v. State.
Although Christie was an insanity-defense case, practitioners
should be mindful of the court’s language because Folger is a
frequently-cited “some evidence” case:
The subject matter being what it is, there can be no sharp
quantitative or qualitative definition of “some evidence.”
Certainly it means more than a scintilla, yet, of course, the
amount need not be so substantial as to require, if
uncontroverted, a directed verdict of acquittal. The judgment of
the trial judge as to the sufficiency of the evidence is entitled to
great weight on appeal, but, since the defendant’s burden is

163. A prosecutor must be mindful that comment on a defendant’s pre-arrest
silence carries the risk of plain-error reversal. See Hamilton, 59 P.3d at 768–69
(approving the trial judge’s instruction to the jury that it was not permitted to
make an adverse determination about the defendant’s failure to testify); see also
Silvernail v. State, 777 P.2d 1169, 1175 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989) (reserving the issue
of whether questions about pre-Miranda silence are constitutionally permissible).
164. See Paul v. State, 655 P.2d 772, 775–76 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
165. 648 P.2d 111 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 113 (quoting Christie v. State, 580 P.2d 310, 314–15 (Alaska 1978)).
168. Id. at 113–14.
169. 580 P.2d 310 (Alaska 1978).
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merely170to raise the issue, any real doubt should be resolved in his
favor.

Although the courts themselves sometimes disagree as to the
171
precise standard, almost any evidence that transcends “sheer
172
speculation” will qualify.
b. A “Some Evidence” Dilemma. The “some evidence”
standard has been applied differently, and perhaps inconsistently,
in the specific instance where the defendant provokes an argument,
leaves, and returns armed with a deadly weapon.
173
In Bangs v. State, the defendant Bangs started a verbal
174
The argument got out of
altercation with a neighbor, Troyer.
hand, and Troyer ended up choking Bangs and screaming, “Don’t
175
be fucking with me, I’m a killer . . . .” Bangs left, armed himself
with a gun, returned to confront Troyer, and pointed the weapon at
176
Troyer. Troyer jumped down from the bed of a dump truck and
177
lunged at Bangs, and Bangs fired, killing Troyer. Bangs testified
that he fired because he felt Troyer would overpower and kill
170. Id. at 314–15 (quoting McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 849 (D.C.
Cir. 1962) (footnotes omitted)).
171. See, e.g., Weston v. State, 682 P.2d 1119 (Alaska 1984). In Weston, the
defendant and the sixty year-old male victim engaged in an argument over money
to pay for alcohol at the victim’s home. Id. at 1120. Weston testified that the
victim pulled a knife on him and, in the struggle that ensued, Weston eventually
gained control of the knife and slashed the victim’s throat, killing him. Id.
Weston requested a self-defense instruction, which the trial judge denied. Id. at
1121. The supreme court reversed, holding that the defendant’s testimony
provided “some evidence” regarding both the subjective (he must have believed
force was necessary) and objective (the belief must have been reasonable) selfdefense test. Id. at 1122. The court noted that the victim was intoxicated (with a
blood alcohol level of 0.269 percent), had attacked the defendant with a knife, and
had access to guns nearby in the room during the struggle. Id. Justice Compton’s
vigorous dissent pointed out that Weston had control of the knife and could have
secured possession of the firearms or could have dragged “him [the victim] across
the street to the police station.” Id. at 1124 (Compton, J., dissenting).
172. See, e.g., Paul v. State, 655 P.2d 772 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (“The burden
to produce some evidence of self-defense is not, however, a heavy one; this
standard is satisfied when self-defense has fairly been called into issue.”); Cano v.
Municipality of Anchorage, No. A-8441, 2004 WL 1737591, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App.
Aug. 4, 2004) (“[T]his burden [to produce evidence in support of a self-defense
claim] is not a heavy one.”) (citations omitted).
173. 608 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1980).
174. Id. at 2.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 2–3.
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him.178 Bangs’s trial defense counsel requested an instruction that
179
Bangs was not required to retreat, which the trial court denied.
The supreme court affirmed, ruling that failure to give the
requested “no-duty-to-retreat” instruction was not error, because
180
The
Bangs was not even entitled to a self-defense instruction.
court explained that “[t]he law of self-defense is designed to afford
protection to one who is beset by an aggressor and confronted by
181
necessity not of his own making.” Bangs, however, had set into
motion the events that led to the crime, and was therefore not
182
entitled to claim self-defense.
183
In a similar case, McMahan v. State, the defendant had lived
184
with his former girlfriend. A few days after an argument which
resulted in McMahan moving out, the girlfriend introduced him to
185
her new boyfriend, the victim. The victim told McMahan to stay
away, and told McMahan that he “[had] a new rifle and I wouldn’t
186
McMahan left and armed himself
want to use it . . . on you.”
before returning to his former girlfriend’s apartment, later claiming
that “[it would] be foolish to go back up there if I wasn’t able to
187
After returning to the apartment and kicking
defend myself.”
188
He later
open the door, McMahan shot and killed the victim.
189
testified that the victim “came at him with a knife.” The supreme
court held that McMahan was not entitled to a self-defense
190
Following the reasoning from Bangs, the court
instruction.
explained that “when a defendant has a prior grievance with the
deceased and takes a deadly weapon to an encounter with the
deceased, the defendant should be deemed to have provoked the
violence which resulted in the death,” and thus be precluded from
191
bringing a self-defense instruction.

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. (quoting State v. Millett, 273 A.2d 504, 510 (Me. 1971)).
Id.
617 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1980).
Id. at 501.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 495.
Id. at 501.
Id. at 501–02.
Id. at 502.
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Bangs and McMahan stand in sharp contrast with two later
court of appeals decisions. In Brown v. State,192 the defendant
argued with the victim, who the defendant found at his wife’s
193
Brown and the victim both left the home, but Brown
home.
armed himself with a .22 caliber rifle and sought out the victim,
194
Brown testified that
allegedly intending only to talk to him.
during the course of the conversation the victim leveled a .44
195
magnum at him. Brown testified that he fired at the victim just
196
The court of appeals held that
before the victim fired at him.
even weak self-defense cases satisfy the “some evidence” test, and
197
that the factual implausibility of the claim is a matter for the jury.
Unlike Bangs, the court explained, the evidence here suggested
that Brown merely wanted to talk to the victim, not harm him. To
this end, the crucial inquiry is not “whether [the defendant] was
armed when he went to meet [the victim]; rather, it is whether his
assault occurred ‘in the course of a dispute provoked by the
defendant at a time when he knew or ought reasonably to have
198
known that the encounter would result in mortal combat.’”
199
Likewise, in Klumb v. State, the defendant had an ongoing
200
He armed himself with a
financial dispute with the victim.
handgun, because he considered the victim to be potentially
dangerous, and sought out the victim to “get this thing talked
201
out.” According to Klumb’s testimony, he confronted the victim
202
in his home and the victim pulled out a gun from his waistband.
Klumb fired, “not aiming at anything,” but striking the victim in
203
204
the skull. He then fired again to “stop his ‘nervous twitching.’”
The court of appeals reasoned that the trial judge erroneously
relied upon McMahan, holding that Klumb was entitled to a self-

192. 698 P.2d 671 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
193. Id. at 672.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 674.
198. Id. (quoting State v. Millett, 273 A.2d 504, 510 (Me. 1971)) (alterations in
original).
199. 712 P.2d 909 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
200. Id. at 910.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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defense instruction because Klumb could not reasonably have
concluded that arming himself would result in mortal combat.205
It is very difficult to reconcile Bangs, Brown, McMahan, and
Klumb. In each of these four cases, a defendant engaged in a
confrontation, went away, armed himself, and returned to continue
the dispute. Bangs and McMahan hold that the defendant had
forfeited his right to self-defense. Klumb and Brown hold the
contrary. The dilemma is highlighted by Judge Singleton in his
Klumb dissent and concurrence, criticizing the Klumb majority for
“ignor[ing] inconvenient precedents of the Alaska Supreme
206
Court.” The cases are only reconcilable to the extent that Bangs
did not testify that his victim confronted him with a weapon, while
Klumb did. While McMahan was arguably confronted with deadly
force (the knife), he was also clearly the first aggressor, had
invaded another person’s apartment, and unquestionably had a
duty to retreat. Brown, like Klumb, testified that he was
207
confronted with a deadly weapon and “won the draw.”
E. Did the Defendant Face an “Imminent” Threat?
Alaska’s self-defense statute requires that one must
208
reasonably act to defend oneself (or another) against “force.”
Alaska’s statutory definition of “force” requires that the threat of
209
Therefore, if the defendant’s
bodily impact be “imminent.”
proffer does not include a showing of an imminent threat, his
request for a self-defense instruction will be denied.
210
For example, in Grandberry-Williams v. State, the defendant
accelerated his car and spun his wheels in a crowded Anchorage
parking lot at bar-closing time, throwing up stones from the
211
The victim ran after the defendant’s vehicle to tell
pavement.
him to stop spinning his wheels, and after an exchange of words,
Grandberry-Williams “sucker punched” him, dropping him to the
212
The prosecution called a third-party witness who
pavement.
testified that the victim made no aggressive movement toward
205. Id. at 911–12.
206. Id. at 913 (Singleton, J., concurring and dissenting).
207. See Brown v. State, 698 P.2d 671, 672 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
208. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.330 (2004), amended by Act effective Sept. 13, 2006,
ch. 68, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws.
209. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(27) (2005), amended by Act effective
Sept. 14, 2006, ch. 73, § 6, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws.
210. No. A-8384, 2004 WL 178950 (Alaska Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2004). The author
was the trial prosecutor.
211. Id. at *1.
212. Id.
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Grandberry-Williams.213 Grandberry-Williams did not testify.214
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s refusal to instruct on
self-defense, ruling that mere verbal confrontation about
aggressive driving in a bar parking lot did not amount to an
215
“imminent threat of use of force” against him.
1. Preemptive Strikes. A defendant may not engage in a
preemptive strike against an anticipated opponent, even if the
opponent has threatened death or violence against the defendant in
216
217
the past. Ha v. State is the leading Alaska “preemptive strike”
case. Ha and Buu were Dillingham fishermen who had fought on
the night before the fatal shooting (Buu had inflicted a head injury
218
on Ha and had threatened to kill him). The next day, twelve to
thirteen hours after the fight, Ha armed himself with a rifle, stalked
Buu, and shot him thirteen times, hitting him in the back at least
219
seven times.
The defense attorney argued that the victim was a member of
a Vietnamese crime family and that “A threat from Buu . . . was as
220
good . . . as a kiss on [the] cheek by a . . . Mafia godfather.” The
defense requested a self-defense instruction, but the trial judge
221
denied the request, holding that Ha faced no “imminent” threat.
The judge correctly reasoned that the concept of imminence was
222
woven into the statutory definition of “force.”
The court of appeals held that Alaska law does not permit
preemptive strikes. There was no showing of “imminent” harm to
Ha because “[a] defendant’s reasonable belief that harm will come
at some future time is not sufficient to support a claim of self223
defense . . . .” Because there was no “imminent” threat to Ha, his
224
conviction was affirmed.
213. Id.
214. Id. at *5.
215. Id.
216. See Ha v. State, 892 P.2d 184, 194 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 186–87.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 188 (alteration and third omission in original).
221. Id.
222. Id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(27) (2005), amended by Act
effective Sept. 14, 2006, ch. 73, § 6, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws (defining “force”)).
223. Id. at 194. The court also noted that “‘inevitable’ harm is not the same as
‘imminent’ harm.” Id. at 191 (finding that harm is inevitable, as opposed to
imminent, if it is likely to occur at some time after, rather than during, the
confrontation).
224. Id. at 196.
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Thus, even if a defendant actually and reasonably believes
that, sooner or later, his enemy will choose an opportune moment
to attack and kill him, the law does not allow the defendant to seek
out and kill his enemy. The defendant’s use of force against his
enemy is authorized only when the defendant actually and
reasonably believes that the enemy’s threatened attack is
225
imminent.
2. “Battered Spouse” Cases. The requirement of immediacy
has important application in “battered spouse” cases. Thirteen
years before Ha, the court of appeals posited (in dicta) that Alaska
law would not support a “battered woman” defense where a
226
domestic violence victim killed her abuser in a preemptive strike.
Typically, these cases involve a battered and fearful wife who kills
her husband in his sleep. Despite ample evidence that such a
killing was motivated by real and urgent fear, such a self-defense
claim would properly be denied because as long as the husband is
227
sleeping there is no immediate threat of harm.
The key to the analysis of such “battered spouse” cases is the
degree to which the defense can establish a present and immediate
threat at the time the fatal blow was delivered. Resolution of this
threshold question will carry portentous evidentiary consequences.
For instance, where a defendant kills her batterer without an
immediate threat of harm (in his sleep, for instance), the defense’s
228
request for a self-defense instruction would be squarely barred.
With self-defense precluded from the jury’s consideration, the jury
will never hear about the specific acts that grounded the
defendant’s fear no matter how persuasive or grievous those acts
229
Nor would the jury hear reputation evidence
may be.
225. Id. at 194; see also Paul v. State, 655 P.2d 772, 778 n.8 (Alaska Ct. App.
1982); McGee v. State, 95 P.3d 945, 947 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004) (affirming the
denial of a self-defense instruction based on the lack of evidence of imminent
threat).
226. Paul, 655 P.2d at 778 n.8.
227. Id.
228. See Ha, 892 P.2d at 194; Paul, 655 P.2d at 778 n.8.
229. See Loesche v. State, 620 P.2d 646, 651 (Alaska 1980) (holding testimony
of the victim’s prior acts of violence was inadmissible because there was
insufficient evidence justifying a self-defense instruction). In Deacon v. State, No.
A-4399, 1993 WL 13156808 (Alaska Ct. App. June 23, 1993), the court of appeals
held that, where the defendant did not testify, called no witnesses, and offered
evidence that the victim had assaulted the defendant on several prior occasions as
the only support for his self-defense claim, the evidence was properly excluded.
Id. at *1–2. This statement—that reputation evidence is inadmissible if the
defendant is not entitled to a self-defense instruction—is still valid, but Deacon is
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establishing the victim’s derogatory reputation for violence.230 Such
issues could only be heard at sentencing, which is cold comfort for
231
the defense.
On the other hand, where a battered spouse establishes a
colorable claim of a present and imminent threat at the time the
fatal blow was delivered perhaps where the defendant testifies
that the victim approached aggressively the defense would be
able to distinguish Ha, Hilbish, and Hamilton. With self-defense
fairly in play, the torrent of derogatory evidence establishing the
decedent as a batterer would be admissible and may be placed
before the jury.
F. Did the Defendant Fear “Unlawful” Force?
To claim self-defense, the defendant must be reacting to
232
A person has no privilege to resist a lawful
“unlawful” force.
233
In Gray v. State,234
arrest carried out with non-excessive force.

a good example of pre-1996 appellate confusion about the purposes for which a
victim’s prior specific acts are admissible. After 1996, a victim’s prior specific acts
are admissible only where the defendant admits to the charged assault, where the
defendant knew of the prior act, and where they are used to prove that the
defendant’s use of force was reasonable. See infra Part V.B.2. The Deacon court
noted that the defendant sought to admit the prior specific-act evidence to prove
the identity of the initial aggressor, 1993 WL 13156808, at *1, a position
inconsistent with post-1996 Alaska case law, see infra Part V.B.2.
230. See Norris v. State, 857 P.2d 349, 351–52 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993) (finding
evidence of the victim’s reputation for violence was irrelevant and properly
excluded where the defendant presented no evidence of self-defense); Rexford v.
State, No. A-8539, 2004 WL 2676430, at *2–3 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2004)
(excluding evidence of the victim’s prior violent acts because the defendant was
not entitled to a self-defense instruction).
231. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.55.155(d)(3), (16) (2005) (allowing a sentence to
be mitigated if the defendant committed the offense under “duress, coercion,
threat, or compulsion insufficient to constitute a complete defense” or if the
assault or homicide was committed “in response to domestic violence”).
232. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.330(a) (2004), amended by Act effective Sept. 13,
2006, ch. 68, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws.
233. Jurco v. State, 825 P.2d 909, 913–15 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992). The court
discussed the legislature’s 1982 repeal of the statute authorizing resistance to
unlawful arrests:
Under Miller, citizens having good reason to believe they were being
unlawfully arrested were nevertheless obliged to submit peaceably to a
deprivation of their personal liberty and await their day in court. . . .
[T]he Alaska legislature briefly reinstated the common law rule that
allowed such battles between officers and private citizens who disputed
the legality of an arrest. Soon, however, the legislature re-established
the rule and policies announced in Miller . . . . It follows that Jurco was
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Gray shot and killed a police officer who tried to arrest him as he
escaped from an armed robbery.235 Gray requested a self-defense
236
instruction from the trial court, but this request was refused. The
supreme court affirmed the denial, holding “that appellants
provoked the difficulty by committing the armed robbery.
Authority clearly supports . . . and indicates that a person who
237
provokes a difficulty thereby forfeits his right to self-defense.”
Whether or not the victim’s use of force was “lawful” appears
238
to be a legal issue for the court, not a factual one for the jury. If
the court determines that the victim’s use of force was “lawful,” it
may properly deny a self-defense instruction and remove the issue
239
from jury consideration.
G. Did the Defendant Use Excessive Force?
Because defendants are permitted to use force only “when and
to the extent” necessary, a defendant’s use of force may become
excessive at some point during an assault. For instance, while the
first shot may have been fired in self-defense, the tenth shot may
240
not have been. In State v. Walker, the defendant was confronted
241
by a hostile group at a party. He stabbed one man once in the
arm, and another man three times once in the neck, and twice in
242
the chest. The first victim had his bicep severed, and the second
243
The jury acquitted the
victim suffered a collapsed lung.
244
defendant of the first stabbing, but convicted him of the second.
The court of appeals held that the verdicts were not inconsistent
because the jury could have concluded that the degree of force
against the first man was reasonable, whereas the degree of force

not entitled to forcibly resist the State Troopers’ efforts to seize his
truck . . . .
Id.
234. 463 P.2d 897 (Alaska 1970).
235. Id. at 900.
236. Id. at 907.
237. Id. at 908.
238. See, e.g., Logan v. State, No. A-8477, 2004 WL 1837674, at *8 (Alaska Ct.
App. Aug. 18, 2004).
239. See id. at *8–9 (finding the defendant did not reasonably fear “unlawful”
force, and thus could not claim self-defense, where the defendant was the first
aggressor and the opponent’s use of force against him was “lawful”).
240. 887 P.2d 971 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
241. Id. at 976.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
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against the second was excessive.245 The court discussed limits upon
the actual use of force, distinguishing between pointing a gun,
firing a warning shot in the air, and then actually shooting to kill:
“Even though a person faces a threat of imminent death or serious
physical injury, so that he or she is legally entitled to use deadly
force in self-defense, the law still requires that the force used be no
246
greater than necessary to avert the danger.”
When faced with an excessive force scenario, a court could
find useful language in Justice Matthews’ Weston opinion and
Judge Mannheimer’s Walker opinion, and from these two could
craft a useful “excessive force” instruction. One could correctly
cite both cases for the following proposition:
A defendant’s claim of self-defense requires that the defendant
must have actually believed the degree of force used247was
A
necessary, and this belief must be objectively reasonable.
basic tenet of the doctrine of self-defense is that use of deadly
force is unreasonable if non-deadly force is obviously sufficient
248
to avert the threatened harm.
Even in circumstances when a
person is permitted to use deadly force in self-defense, that
person may still not be authorized to employ all-out deadly force
because such extreme force is not necessary to avert the
249
danger.

H. Did the Defendant Have a Subjectively Held, Objectively
Reasonable Belief in the Necessity of Using Force?
A defendant may use force only to the extent that he
reasonably believes that force is necessary to defend himself
250
against what he reasonably believes is unlawful force. Assuming
the defense has met the “some evidence” threshold, prosecutors
must sustain a burden that defense lawyers seldom bear: proof of
multiple negative propositions beyond a reasonable doubt.
Nonetheless, a defendant’s actions sometimes provide strong
evidence that he, in fact, held no sincere, subjective belief in the
necessity of using force. The prosecutor should also be aware of
how objective reasonableness plays out in cases of mental illness
and intoxication.

245. Id. at 978.
246. Id.
247. Weston v. State, 682 P. 2d 1119, 1121 (Alaska 1984).
248. Id. at 1124 (Compton, J., dissenting).
249. Walker, 887 P.2d at 978.
250. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.81.330(a), .335(a) (2004), amended by Act
effective Sept. 13, 2006, ch. 68, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws.
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1. Actions that Undermine a Defendant’s Claim to Have a
Subjective Belief in the Necessity of Using Force. The prosecutor
inevitably must rely upon circumstantial evidence to prove that a
defendant did not subjectively believe in the necessity of his use of
251
Two types of circumstantial evidence may undermine a
force.
defendant’s claim to have held this belief: (1) when the defendant
ran from the scene, and (2) when the defendant lied afterward.
a. The Defendant Ran from the Scene. Flight from the scene
of a shooting has been held admissible as inconsistent with self252
defense and probative of consciousness of guilt. Such evidence is
admissible notwithstanding the fact that there were other possible
253
explanations for the defendant’s flight. Alternative explanations
254
are a matter of the evidence’s weight, not its admissibility.
This principle is aptly—if theatrically—summed up in Rexford
255
v. State, a case in which the defendant fled the scene. The
prosecutor paraphrased the Bible, saying that “the guilty flees when
256
no man pursueth; the righteous stand as bold as a lion.” The court
of appeals held that this argument was not prosecutorial
misconduct, and did not interject the prosecutor’s personal opinion
257
about the defendant’s guilt.
b. The Defendant Lied. Alaska courts frequently admit
evidence of a false-exculpatory statement as circumstantial
evidence of guilt, even where there are benign alternative
258
explanations. Circumstantial evidence of guilt is doubly relevant

251. Alaska’s pattern jury instructions provide, “State of mind may be proved
by circumstantial evidence. It rarely can be established by any other means.”
Alaska Pattern Jury Instruction 1.44 (Criminal), quoted in Sivertsen v. State, 981
P.2d 564, 566 n.10 (Alaska 1999).
252. Dyer v. State, 666 P.2d 438, 448–49 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (“Dyer’s flight
and elaborate attempts to evade the authorities could be interpreted as evidence
that he had not shot in self-defense and to show his consciousness of guilt.”).
253. Id. at 449.
254. Id.; see also Roberts v. State, 453 P.2d 898, 905–06 nn.27–28 (Alaska 1969)
(holding that the defendant’s flight, efforts to avoid arrest, and possession of a
firearm unrelated to the offense were all relevant and admissible “under the
general doctrine which permits a full showing as to flight”).
255. No. A-8539, 2004 WL 2676430 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2004).
256. Id. at *11–12 (citing Proverbs 28:1).
257. Id. at *12.
258. See Sakeagak v. State, 952 P.2d 278, 283 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998) (affirming
the admission of false exculpatory statements as circumstantial evidence of the
defendant’s consciousness of guilt); Bloomstrand v. State, 656 P.2d 584, 590
(Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a jury instruction charging the jury with
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in a self-defense case, where subjective belief in one’s justified
actions is an essential element of the defense.259 Thus, a prosecutor
should be entitled to argue that the defendant did not subjectively
believe that his use of force was justified if the defendant lied to
investigators or civilians (this often takes the form of denying that
he was at the crime scene).
A prosecutor must be mindful that commenting on a
defendant’s pre-arrest silence carries the risk of plain-error
260
However, where a defendant makes a statement to
reversal.
police, does not claim self-defense, and then testifies differently at
trial, he may be properly questioned about his failure to claim self261
defense when interviewed by police.
2. Reasonableness in Cases of Mental Illness and Intoxication.
The law assesses the “reasonableness” of a defendant’s actions in
light of a person whose mental abilities are not impaired by mental
262
illness or brain damage. In other words, there is no such thing as
a “reasonable” paranoid schizophrenic. The court of appeals has
affirmed the following jury instruction: “When these instructions
use the term ‘reasonable person’ or ‘reasonably believe’[] they
mean a reasonable, mentally healthy person whose thinking is not
influenced by mental difficulties that skew or affect his ability to

determining whether the defendant exhibited signs of consciousness of guilt, to be
done by comparing prior statements made by the defendant and the fact that he
did not make these statements during the trial while testifying, was a valid jury
instruction).
259. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.81.330, .335 (2004), amended by Act effective
Sept. 13, 2006, ch. 68, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws.
260. See generally Silvernail v. State, 777 P.2d 1169 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
Silvernail held that the prosecutor’s questioning of the defendant about his failure
to claim duress during his initial conversation with police had little probative value
and was unduly prejudicial, thus violating Alaska Rule of Evidence 403. Id. at
1174–75. It should be noted that the Silvernail court specifically reserved the
question of whether questions about pre-Miranda silence are constitutionally
permissible. Id. at 1175.
261. See Joseph v. State, No. A-9055, 2006 WL 1360945, at *22–23 (Alaska Ct.
App. May 17, 2006) (holding that questioning about pre-trial statements was not
an improper comment on the defendant’s right to silence because the defendant
had chosen to break his silence, and the prosecution had the right to question him
about his inconsistent statements).
262. Ha v. State, 892 P.2d 184, 195–96 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
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form reasonable thought processes or to act in a reasonable
fashion.”263
Because participants in street crime assaults are often under
the influence of alcohol or street drugs, defendants who claim selfdefense at trial were often themselves under the influence of
intoxicants at the time of the charged event. Regardless, Alaska’s
self-defense statute holds defendants to the standard of a sober,
264
reasonable person. In Nygren v. State, the defendant, while
265
On appeal, she argued that a
drunk, stabbed her husband.
breathalyzer result, which measured her blood alcohol content
266
(0.210% at the time of her arrest) should not have been admitted.
The supreme court stated that self-defense requires that “the
circumstances be such that a reasonable person would believe that
she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury. The
focus here is on the circumstances as they would appear to a
reasonable person. The intoxication of the appellant is not
267
germane to that question.”
Thus, the jury instruction for mental illness from Ha may
logically be adapted for defendants who were intoxicated: “When
these instructions use the term ‘reasonable person’ or ‘reasonably
believe,’ they mean a reasonable, sober, mentally healthy person
whose thinking is not influenced by alcohol or intoxicating drugs
that skew or affect the ability to form reasonable thought processes
268
This inferential step is
or to act in a reasonable fashion.”
bolstered by the fact that intoxication is generally voluntary while
mental illness is not, so a stringent reasonable person standard is
more likely to be upheld and applied where the defendant
voluntarily incapacitated himself.
V. THE USE OF PRIOR ACTS AND REPUTATION EVIDENCE
Evidence of reputation and specific prior acts—of both the
defendant and the victim—can be especially powerful in the minds
of a jury. Such evidence can suggest that a person was generally
peaceful or combative, or had specific reason to be fearful in a
situation that ultimately lead to the claim of self-defense.

263. Id. at 197. The court of appeals took care to mention that, when the trial
judge inquired about the drafting of the instruction, the prosecutor boldly stated,
“I wrote it last night.” Id.
264. 616 P.2d 20 (Alaska 1980).
265. Id. at 21–22.
266. Id. at 22.
267. Id.
268. See Ha, 892 P.2d at 197.
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Therefore, an understanding of the rules for admitting prior bad
acts and reputation evidence is essential to the criminal bar.
A. The Defendant’s Prior Acts and Reputation
Four reasons for admitting evidence of the defendant’s prior
acts and reputation often arise in self-defense trials. These are: (1)
to establish combative attitude near the time of the offense, (2) to
show motive or intent after self-defense has been raised, (3) in
cases of domestic violence assaults, and (4) to counter the
defendant’s claimed reputation for peacefulness.
1. The Defendant’s Prior Acts are Admissible to Show
Combative Attitude Near the Time of the Charged Offense. Many
cases have held that the defendant’s prior acts are relevant to show
269
For instance,
he was combative near the time of the offense.
270
Lerchenstein v. State concluded that the trial judge “did not abuse
his discretion in admitting other evidence concerning
Lerchenstein’s angry and combative behavior immediately prior to
271
the shooting incident.” The court reasoned:
In order to establish that Lerchenstein did not act in selfdefense, the state was entitled to rely on evidence indicating
that, at the time of the shooting, [Lerchenstein] was angry,
emotionally agitated, and extremely combative—in other words,
that he was not acting reasonably . . . . Since this evidence had
specific relevance beyond its mere tendency to establish a
propensity toward violence, its admission
was not categorically
272
precluded by Evidence Rule 404(b).

269. See, e.g., Seek v. State, No. A-6098, 1998 WL 80112, at *8–9 (Alaska Ct.
App. Feb. 25, 1998) (holding that the defendant’s prior threatening statement was
properly admitted under Rule 404(b)(1) to prove his state of mind at the time of
the shooting); see also Pitt v. State, No. 6292, 1997 WL 796503, at *2–4 (Alaska Ct.
App. Dec. 24, 1997) (holding that the court properly admitted evidence of the
defendant’s aggressive demeanor in the emergency room following a fatal
stabbing because the evidence was relevant to his state of mind at the time he
claimed to have acted in self-defense).
270. 697 P.2d 312 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985), aff’d per curiam, 726 P.2d 546
(Alaska 1986).
271. Id. at 319.
272. Id. at 317–18. Lerchenstein is occasionally cited as authority to exclude
“prior bad acts” evidence under Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1) on the
grounds that other bad acts evidence is inherently prejudicial and presumptively
inadmissible. However, this aspect of Lerchenstein—arguably, its core holding—
was specifically overruled by the 1991 Alaska Legislature when it amended Rule
404(b). See Act effective Sept. 24, 1991, ch. 79, § 1(c), 1991 Alaska Sess. Laws.
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Another interesting example is Abuhl v. State.273 Abuhl had an
274
The
argument with his victim about the victim’s cat, Gizmo.
275
argument resulted in the victim striking Abuhl with a bat. The
next day, Abuhl fatally stabbed this victim, and tried to microwave
276
Gizmo (the cat survived). Abuhl was charged with murder and
277
Abuhl pled to the animal cruelty charge, but
animal cruelty.
defended the murder charge by arguing self-defense and heat of
278
He then argued that evidence about Gizmo was
passion.
279
irrelevant. The trial judge admitted evidence, including photos,
280
of the harm to Gizmo. The court of appeals affirmed, noting that
the evidence refuted Abuhl’s claim that he acted out of temporary
passion and proved his motive (anger about the cat, rather than
281
self-preservation).
2. The Defendant’s Prior Acts are Admissible to Show Motive
or Intent After Self-Defense Has Been Raised. A classic case
282
Brown was
illustrating this point is Brown v. Municipality.
283
The Brown court held that
charged with shooting a dog.
evidence that the defendant pursued and fatally shot a dog ten
months before the charged incident was admissible to prove his
motive (hatred of dogs) and the utter implausibility of the self284
defense claim. The case centered on whether Brown believed it
285
was necessary to shoot the dog and if that belief was reasonable.
The court reasoned that evidence of the prior shooting was
probative of Brown’s motive or state of mind (to show that Brown
286
acted out of hatred of dogs rather than fear). The evidence was
also probative of Brown’s intent (it showed “the implausibility of
Brown’s claim that the dog lunged at him” and “establish[ed] that
287
his fears, if they existed at all, were unreasonable”). Evidence of

273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

No. A-8534, 2004 WL 2020346 (Alaska Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2004).
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *3–4.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *5–6.
Id. at *6–7.
915 P.2d 654 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
Id. at 655.
Id. at 656.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the prior incidents was therefore admissible.288 This aspect of
289
Brown is consistent with prior Alaska cases.
290
On the other hand, Bass v. State demonstrates that such
admissibility is not unlimited. Bass stabbed a man named Foss
291
Foss’ friend Powers
following an argument about gas money.
angrily approached Bass, grabbed Bass’ cigarette from his mouth,
292
293
and demanded money. Bass pushed Powers back. Foss joined
294
Bass pulled a folding buck knife
the affray and punched Bass.
295
and stabbed Foss in the heart, killing him. At trial, Bass argued
296
The prosecution offered six prior assaultive
self-defense.
episodes to rebut Bass’ self-defense claim, and the trial judge
allowed the prosecution to introduce the fact that Bass had been
convicted of misdemeanor assault five years before the fatal
297
The prosecution offered no facts about the prior
stabbing.
298
Once the court allowed the prosecution to admit the
event.
assault conviction, the parties reached a stipulation which was read
299
The court of
to the jury (omitting the facts of the prior case).
288. Id. at 657; see also Adkinson v. State, 611 P.2d 528 (Alaska 1980) (holding
that evidence of hostile confrontations at shotgun-point with trespassers upon
remote property was admissible to rebut accident and self-defense themes). See
generally EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE §
5:04, at 8 (1984; rev. 1995); 22 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5242, at 487–88 (1978).
289. See, e.g., Sheakley v. State, 644 P.2d 864, 873–75 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982)
(finding the introduction of previous eye-gouging incidents admissible); Halberg v.
State, No. A-3733, 1993 WL 13156720 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 28, 1993) (holding
that evidence of a wife’s jealousy was properly admitted to rebut her battered
woman’s syndrome defense).
290. No. A-6669, 1999 WL 11052 (Alaska Ct. App. Jan. 13, 1999).
291. Id. at *1.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at *2.
297. Id. at *1.
298. Id.
299. Id. The technique of offering only the bare fact of conviction, and not
developing the underlying facts, is not sound practice. The fact of judicial
conviction, when viewed in the Rule 403 context, is the most prejudicial and least
enlightening probative aspect of a prior criminal event. This point is illuminated
by Calapp v. State, 959 P.2d 385, 387 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998). Calapp was
prosecuted for second-degree theft after he pawned stolen jewelry. The most
significant issue at trial was whether Calapp had recklessly disregarded the fact
that the pawned jewelry was stolen. To rebut Calapp’s claim of mistake or
accident, the trial judge allowed the State to present evidence that Calapp had
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appeals held that this was error because it constituted evidence of
prior bad acts barred by Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2).300 The
court found that the convictions had been used to rebut Bass’ selfdefense claim, whereas Rules 404(a)(2) and 405 limited the parties
to using reputation and opinion evidence not specific acts as the
301
sole method of proving the character of the assailant.
3. Domestic Violence Assaults are Generally Admissible. In
domestic violence prosecutions, evidence of prior specific acts of
domestic violence is generally admissible to disprove a claim of
302
One of the most important cases in this regard is
self-defense.
303
Ayagarak v. State, in which the defendant was charged and tried
304
for assaulting his wife. The court held that his three prior assaults
against his wife were admissible to rebut his claim of self-defense
305
Ayagarak is
and to show the nature of their relationship.
tremendously important for prosecutors because the court held
that admissibility of prior bad acts is governed by the minimal
previously been convicted of theft and forgery. The prosecution did not offer the
facts of the previous cases, merely the bare fact of conviction. A split court of
appeals held that evidence of the convictions was improperly admitted because
the fact of conviction, standing alone, told the jury little or nothing about Calapp’s
knowledge that the jewelry was stolen. Id. at 388. Bass was decided as a Rule
404(b)(2) case. In light of Allen, the Bass court’s holding is obviously correct—
specific acts are inadmissible on direct examination under Rule 404(a)(2). Yet, if
the Bass prosecution had been able to establish that the facts of the prior
assaultive events were somewhat similar to the Foss stabbing, it could have relied
on Adkinson and Brown to make a far more persuasive offer under Rule
404(b)(1).
300. Bass, 1999 WL 11052, at *3.
301. Id. However, the court found that this error was harmless because the
prosecution did not place emphasis on the prior assault during summation. Id. at
*3–4. The court of appeals did not resolve the State’s claim on appeal that Bass’s
prior conviction and his other assaultive events may have been admissible for
alternative, non-propensity reasons, such as demonstrating his state of mind,
disproving the reasonableness of a self-defense claim, and to show that Bass was
aware of his own tendency to use excessive force in confrontational situations. See
id.
302. See Heaps v. State, 30 P.2d 109, 109 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001) (“As an
earlier episode of domestic violence, the August incident was admissible under
Evidence Rule 404(b)(4) to prove that Heaps was the aggressor in November.”);
see also Akaran v. State, No. A-8690, 2005 WL 1026992, at *5–7 (Alaska Ct. App.
May 4, 2005) (affirming admission of two prior assaults on the same victim to
rebut a self-defense claim).
303. No. A-8066, 2003 WL 1922623 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2003).
304. Id. at *1.
305. Id. at *6.
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“conditional relevance” threshold of Alaska Rule of Evidence
104(b).306 The court specifically rejected a claim that “other acts”
evidence must be proven by the standard of clear and convincing
307
evidence.
308
Plyler v. State is another example. In Plyler, the court held
that evidence of specific violent conduct in a prior relationship was
sufficiently similar and related to the present case, a homicide
stemming from a love triangle, to justify admission of the
defendant’s prior bizarre and violent behavior under Rule
309
404(b)(1). Despite the fact that this relationship occurred six to
eight years prior to the charged murder, there were significant
similarities between the relationships: “Plyler’s actions within the
[first] love triangle relationship evidenced a jealous and
inflammatory reaction to the situation. The evidence tended to
establish the state’s theory that Plyler reacted in the same manner
310
in his relationship with Faye and Peter Nicely.”
4. Countering the Defendant’s Reputation for Peacefulness.
Where a defendant offers testimony of his own good character, the
state is allowed to rebut that testimony by introducing
311
the
contradictory character evidence.
In Salud v. State,
defendant, a Kodiak labor leader, testified that he shot and killed
another labor organizer during an argument in which the victim
312
The defendant affirmatively
pulled a .45 handgun on him.
offered testimony that he was “a nice guy,” “a good man,” and was
313
However, the trial court permitted the
“liked by the people.”
state to rebut his testimony by calling the Kodiak police chief, who
testified that the defendant had a reputation in Kodiak as being a
314
The court of appeals affirmed this use of
violent person.
315
character evidence.
316
In Fuzzard v. State, the defendant stabbed two men after a
317
He was charged with attempted murder and
barroom brawl.

306. Id. at *4 (citing Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691–92 (1988)).
307. Id.
308. No. A-6654, 1999 WL 189660 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 7, 1999).
309. Id. at *3. Although evidence of prior unrelated assaults was improper, it
did not require reversal due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt. Id.
310. Id.
311. 630 P.2d 1008 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981).
312. Id. at 1010.
313. Id. at 1010–11.
314. Id. at 1010.
315. Id. at 1011.
316. No. A-8023, 2003 WL 21981931 (Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2003).
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assault.318 He argued self-defense at trial.319 The prosecutor offered
evidence from a man with whom Fuzzard shared a jail cell for two
weeks, ten months after the attack, that Fuzzard was “really
320
Fuzzard’s
violent” and that his temper “explodes rapidly.”
321
cellmate also testified that Fuzzard was reputed to be violent.
The court of appeals affirmed admission of this testimony,
specifically ruling that “reputation testimony” could be formed
after the violent event because a person’s character for violence is
322
“more or less permanent” and unlikely to change over time.
B. The Victim’s Prior Acts and Reputation
Prosecutors take their victims in self-defense cases as they find
them. In other words, in street crime prosecution, a defense
investigation will often uncover derogatory victim evidence. This is
especially true given modern, online computerized court record
databases. May a defendant who claims self-defense throw dirt on
the victim? The answer, up to a point, is yes.
The basic principle governing the introduction of evidence
regarding the victim’s prior bad acts and reputation in self-defense
cases is as follows:
When a defendant argues self-defense, he can introduce
evidence of his state of mind to show that he used reasonable
force. Because the testimony is relevant to show the defendant’s
state of mind, he can introduce evidence of any specific incidents
of violence on the part of the victim of which he was aware to
show that he acted reasonably in self-defense. The defendant
can also admit evidence of a victim’s character for violence as
circumstantial evidence to show that the victim was probably the
first aggressor. But to show the victim’s character for violence,
the defendant cannot introduce specific acts; the defendant is
limited to reputation and opinion evidence in establishing the
323
victim’s character for violence.

The court of appeals and the supreme court have stated that this
principle only applies to cases “where the defendant admits killing
or assaulting the victim and puts the issue of self-defense fairly into

317. Id. at *1.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. at *2.
321. Id.
322. Id. (citing 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1618, at 595 (Tillers rev. 1983)).
323. Northcott v. State, No. A-7057, 2001 WL 1042868, at *6 (Alaska Ct. App.
Sept. 12, 2001); see also McCracken v. State, 914 P.2d 893, 898–99 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1996).
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question.”324 Evidence of the victim’s bad character is not relevant
325
326
where the defendant claims accident or an alibi.
Derogatory victim evidence falls into two categories: (1)
derogatory reputation-opinion evidence, and (2) specific violent
acts of which the defendant was aware at the time of the offense.
Each category of evidence is offered for very specific and very
different reasons. Each will be discussed in turn, with specific
327
emphasis on the two leading cases in each area: Allen v. State and
328
McCracken v. State. Allen and McCracken are companion cases,
and it is impossible to understand Alaska’s self-defense law without
reading both of them closely.
It should also be noted that before 1996, when the McCracken
court clarified the point, there was much confusion regarding the
329
Most of the
scope of admissible derogatory-victim evidence.

324. Loesche v. State, 620 P.2d 646, 650 (Alaska 1980); see Amarok v. State,
671 P.2d 882, 883 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (stating that the principle applies where
“the defendant admits the assault, but raises self defense”). A trial judge should
exercise discretion under Evidence Rule 611(a) (regarding court control over the
order of evidence presentation) to restrict evidence of a victim’s specific violent
acts or violent reputation until such time as the defendant concedes his identity as
the assailant before the jury. See Forrest v. State, No. A-3952, 1993 WL 13156497,
at *3 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993) (affirming the refusal to admit testimony of a
victim’s prior specific threat against the defendant until the defendant testified).
325. Byrd v. State, 626 P.2d 1057, 1058 (Alaska 1980); cf. Gottschalk v. State,
881 P.2d 1139, 1143 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994) (noting that evidence of a victim’s
violent character may be admissible if a defendant raises a combined claim of selfdefense and accident). Of course, a jury would probably view a combined claim of
self-defense and accident with some skepticism because self-defense contemplates
deliberate, reasoned behavior with the intentional goal of self-preservation. A
prosecutor confronted with a combined claim of self-defense and accident would
be expected to argue to the jury that people very rarely defend themselves “by
accident.”
326. Marrone v. State, 359 P.2d 969, 984 (Alaska 1961).
327. 945 P.2d 1233 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
328. 914 P.2d 893 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
329. For instance, in Seek v. State, No. A-6098, 1998 WL 80112, at *6 (Alaska
Ct. App. Feb. 25, 1998), the trial court’s decision came before Allen, and the court
of appeals decision was handed down afterward. Seek not only describes the
confusion with great efficacy, but also demonstrates that trial judges before 1996
recognized and were troubled by the Amarok imprecision. See id. The trial judge
even earned high praise from Judge Mannheimer for his handling of the issue; he
“demonstrated the highest qualities of a trial judge” by following “his duty to
apply the law as announced by the appellate court, even though he was convinced
that the appellate court was wrong.” Id. at *6 n.3.
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confusion is owed to Amarok and its progeny.330 As a result, many
cases decided before 1996 are no longer good law with respect to at
331
least part of their holdings. However, other parts of these cases
332
do remain valid. Some confusion also remains from the blurring
of reputation and specific-act evidence that was commonplace
before the Alaska Rules of Evidence were codified. Some aspects
of these early cases were also overruled by the 1996-97
333
Other aspects remain good law.334 Given both
clarifications.

330. See generally Amarok v. State, 671 P.2d 882, 883–84 (Alaska Ct. App.
1983) (containing imprecise language regarding the purpose for which specific
conduct is admissible and imprecise analysis of which of the victim’s prior bad acts
the defendant had knowledge).
331. E.g., Gottschalk v. State, 881 P.2d 1139, 1145 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that the lower court erred in refusing to admit evidence of specific
instances of the victim’s conduct while drunk); Noble v. State, No. A-3841, 1992
WL 12153197, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App. July 15, 1992) (positing that evidence of an
assault was admissible to prove the identity of the initial aggressor); Frank v.
State, No. A-2995, 1989 WL 1595168, at *1–2 (Alaska Ct. App. Sept. 27, 1989)
(stating that evidence of prior specific acts was admissible to prove the identity of
the initial aggressor); see also Williamson v. State, 692 P.2d 965, 971–73 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the exclusion of testimony regarding the victim’s
prior attempt at rape—of which the defendant was unaware—was erroneous
because it would have corroborated the defendant’s testimony). To the extent any
pre-1996 cases seem to support the admissibility of the opponent’s past specific
acts of which the defendant was unaware, they are no longer valid in the wake of
McCracken and Allen.
332. E.g., Gottschalk, 881 P.2d at 1145 (holding that the trial court committed
error when it excluded reputation evidence as circumstantial evidence of the
identity of the initial aggressor); Noble, 1992 WL 12153197, at *2 (holding that
where the defendant denied being the attacker, evidence of the victim’s violent
past attacks were not relevant); Frank, 1989 WL 1595168, at *2 (stating that prior
specific-act evidence was admissible to prove the reasonableness of the
defendant’s use of force on the charged occasion).
333. E.g., Byrd v. State, 626 P.2d 1057, 1058 (Alaska 1980) (holding specific-act
evidence may have been admissible to prove the identity of the initial aggressor);
Keith v. State, 612 P.2d 977, 984 (Alaska 1980) (holding that the exclusion of a
journal which likely contained the victim’s admissions of specific violent acts—
admissions of which the defendant was unaware—was erroneous). These aspects
of Byrd and Keith are no longer good law in the wake of McCracken and Allen.
Keith also held that a defendant who claims self-defense may introduce evidence
of the victim’s violent character without exposing his own character to scrutiny.
See Keith, 612 P.2d at 985 n.23. The 1994 Alaska Legislature changed this by
amending ALASKA R. EVID. 404(a)(2). See Act effective July 17, 1994, ch. 116, §
2, 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws. Allen recognized this new result. Allen, 945 P.2d at
1236.
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sources of confusion, prosecutors and defenders alike should
exercise great care when citing to opinions pre-dating Allen and
McCracken.
1. Derogatory Reputation Evidence. Where a defendant
argues self-defense and asserts (as he must) that the victim was the
initial aggressor, the prosecution may introduce evidence that
establishes the victim’s character for peacefulness or the
335
The defendant may do the
defendant’s character for violence.
same, introducing evidence of his own peaceful character or the
336
victim’s character for violence. However, on direct examination,
this form of evidence is limited to the witness’s opinion of the other
person’s reputation for violence or peacefulness—specific incidents
337
However, the
are admissible only on cross-examination.
defendant is not entitled to present evidence of a victim’s
reputation for violence until the defendant satisfies the “some
338
evidence” test and concedes his identity as the assailant before
339
the jury.
Derogatory reputation evidence is offered for a purpose
usually squarely barred by the evidence rules: to prove that the
actor behaved in conformance with a character trait for
340
peacefulness or violence. In the self-defense context, evidence of
a victim’s reputation for violence or the defendant’s reputation for
peacefulness is admissible as circumstantial proof of the identity of
341
the initial aggressor. When attempting to determine the identity
of the initial aggressor, it does not matter whether the defendant
was aware of the other person’s reputation for violence or
342
In other words, a defendant charged with
peacefulness.
assaulting a stranger may introduce derogatory opinion evidence to
334. E.g., Byrd, 626 P.2d at 1059 (affirming the exclusion of the victim’s prior
robbery and knifepoint threat because the defendant was unaware they had
occurred).
335. ALASKA R. EVID. 404(a)(2).
336. Id.
337. ALASKA R. EVID. 405(a).
338. Norris v. State, 857 P.2d 349, 352–53 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
339. Loesche v. State, 620 P.2d 646, 650 (Alaska 1980); Amarok v. State, 671
P.2d 882, 883 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
340. McCracken v. State, 914 P.2d 893, 898 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
341. Allen v. State, 945 P.2d 1233, 1239 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997). Derogatory
reputation evidence is not admissible to prove the reasonableness of the
defendant’s use of force, but specific-act evidence is. McCracken, 914 P.2d at 898.
342. McCracken, 914 P.2d at 898 (noting that “[the] defendant’s [prior]
knowledge of the [victim’s character] is immaterial” (alteration in original)
(quoting Amarok v. State, 671 P.2d 882, 883–84 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983))).
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establish that his adversary had a reputation for violence among
the people who knew him.343 This is true because the purpose of
this evidence “is to circumstantially prove a question of historical
fact: was the victim the initial aggressor during the encounter
344
between the defendant and the victim?”
In practice, the issue is most commonly raised where the
defendant seeks to call a defense witness who will testify that he
knows the victim and that the victim is reputed to be violent. This
testimony, coming from a witness who may have no firsthand
knowledge of the events at hand, may be admissible but carries
345
only slight probative value.
On direct examination, derogatory reputation evidence is
limited to the witness’s opinion of the actor’s reputation for
346
Inquiry into specific acts is only
violence or peacefulness.
347
permitted on cross-examination. But in the self-defense context,
where the witness holds a derogatory opinion of the victim’s
character and is also very likely aware of the victim’s specific bad
acts, only the most reckless prosecutor would inquire about
348
specifics on cross-examination.
349
In Earl, the defendant
A useful example is Earl v. State.
stabbed his roommate, Ricker, with a pair of scissors and a knife,
350
At Earl’s first trial, his attorney argued that the
killing him.
351
The
killing was done in self-defense, but Earl did not testify.
conviction was reversed because of improper introduction of a
352
In his second trial, Earl testified that
prior assault conviction.
Ricker punched him without provocation and came at him with a
353
knife. Earl testified that there was a struggle, and he grabbed the

343. See ALASKA R. EVID. 405(a).
344. McCracken, 914 P.2d at 898.
345. Galauska v. State, 527 P.2d 459, 467 n.14 (Alaska 1974).
346. Allen, 945 P.2d at 1239 (“Evidence Rules 404(a)(2) and 405 allow only
reputation and opinion evidence to prove the character of the defendant or the
victim.”).
347. Id.; see also ALASKA R. EVID. 405(b).
348. In practice, the defense attorney’s direct examination of a derogatory
opinion witness (testifying to the victim’s violent reputation) should be very brief.
Likewise, a cautious prosecutor should emphasize this witness’s lack of personal
knowledge about the case at hand and avoid inquiry into specifics, as any such
inquiry would probably just elicit damaging facts.
349. No. A-7385, 2002 WL 531097 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2002).
350. Id. at *1.
351. Id. at *2.
352. Id.
353. Id.
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knife and stabbed Ricker.354 Earl defended his second trial on
355
grounds of heat of passion rather than self-defense.
In support of this defense, Earl offered the testimony of a
psychiatrist, who testified that Ricker was a paranoid schizophrenic
who was more likely than others to become violent after drinking
356
alcohol or using drugs. The trial judge ruled that this testimony
opened the door for the prosecution to present seven reputation
357
Two witnesses testified that Earl was a
witnesses.
characteristically violent man and five testified that Ricker had a
358
reputation for peacefulness. The trial judge ruled that the issue
359
was governed by Rule 404(a)(2) and admitted the testimony.
The court of appeals held that Rule 404(a)(2) was not
360
restricted to self-defense cases. By claiming that Ricker was the
first aggressor, even in the heat of passion context, Earl opened the
door for opinion and reputation testimony, circumstantially
361
establishing the identity of the initial aggressor.
a. Allen. Allen v. State362 is the leading Alaska case on the
admissibility of reputation evidence for the purpose of establishing
the identity of the initial aggressor. In Allen, the defendant was
363
Allen
charged with murder for the stabbing death of Labat.
alleged that Labat had come to his apartment and threatened
364
him. Believing his life to be in danger, Allen armed himself with a
kitchen knife, pursued Labat, and ultimately stabbed him to
365
death. Allen was charged with first-degree murder and claimed
366
self-defense.
At trial, the judge allowed the prosecution to present evidence
of two specific instances of Allen’s past violence to undermine his
367
self-defense claim. The prosecution offered evidence that Allen
had been convicted of an assault seven years before the Labat

354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *7–8.
945 P.2d 1233 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 1235.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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stabbing and that he had attacked a woman with a sword a year
before the stabbing.368
The court of appeals reversed Allen’s conviction because this
369
evidence was improperly admitted. The court held that where a
party offers evidence of a person’s character under Rule 404(a)(2)
to prove the identity of the initial aggressor, the party is limited by
Rule 405(a) to offering only opinion and reputation evidence on
direct examination: “[I]n criminal cases involving claims of selfdefense, Evidence Rules 404(a)(2) and 405 allow only reputation
and opinion evidence to prove the character of the defendant or
370
the victim.” This is the case except on cross-examination, during
371
which Rule 405(a) allows evidence of a person’s specific acts.
The Rules of Evidence impose such limits because the
character of the actor is not an “essential element” of the claim of
372
A jury might conclude that Allen was
self-defense.
characteristically violent and that Labat was characteristically
peaceful, but acquit Allen based on the facts of the stabbing
anyway. Alternatively, a jury could conclude that Allen was
373
characteristically violent, but believe that he acted in self-defense.
Therefore, neither Allen’s character nor Labat’s character was an
374
The court concluded that
“essential element” of the defense.
evidence of specific conduct was only admissible on cross375
examination.
b. The Victim’s Reputation for Peacefulness. Under Rule
404(a)(2), the prosecution may present reputation and opinion
evidence, establishing the victim’s peaceful character and rebutting
376
the defendant’s “evidence that the victim was the first aggressor.”
Some defendants have argued that the wording of the rule implies
that such prosecution evidence is admissible only after the defense
368. Id.
369. Id. at 1243.
370. Id. at 1239.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 1240.
373. Id.
374. Id. See ALASKA R. EVID. 405(b) (“In cases in which character or a trait of
character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof
may also be made of specific instances of conduct.”).
375. Allen, 945 P.2d at 1239. Judge Mannheimer criticized the Amarok court
for implying that specific-act testimony was admissible to prove the identity of the
initial aggressor. Id. at 1241–43. He explained that, “as occasionally happens
when courts make pronouncements about matters that are not at issue, we
misdescribed this area of the law.” Id. at 1241.
376. ALASKA R. EVID. 404(a)(2).
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presents its case-in-chief.377 However, the court of appeals has
rejected this claim, holding that the trial judge retains considerable
discretion under Alaska Rule of Evidence 611(a) to control order
378
of proof. The court of appeals has specifically affirmed admission
of evidence of the victim’s peaceful character in the prosecution’s
379
case-in-chief.
Before 1994, Rule 404(a)(2) allowed a defendant in a
homicide case to introduce evidence of the victim’s character for
violence without allowing the prosecution to introduce similar
380
The prosecution was limited to
evidence against the accused.
rebutting the defendant’s evidence that the victim was the first
aggressor by establishing the victim’s character trait for
381
In 1994, the Alaska Legislature amended this
peacefulness.
382
aspect of Rule 404(a)(2). In its “findings and purpose” section,
the legislature stated that “in cases of domestic violence and other
violent crimes in which the defendant claims that the victim was the
initial aggressor, an amendment is necessary to permit the
prosecutor to rebut this claim by introducing evidence of the
383
defendant’s own past violence.”
2. Prior Specific Bad Acts of Which the Defendant was
Aware. Admissibility of a victim’s specific bad acts is an entirely
different matter. Such evidence is offered to prove that the
defendant’s use of force was reasonable because the defendant was
384
aware of ominous, derogatory facts about his opponent’s history.
In other words, the defendant’s argument is: “If you knew him like
I did, you’d have shot him, too. And you would have made that first
shot count. . .”
The defendant is permitted to introduce evidence of specific
prior bad acts of which he was aware before the assault to prove
that they instilled in him a reasonable fear that: (1) he was about to
be attacked, and (2) he reasonably thought that the degree of force

377. Herman v. State, No. A-7240, 2000 WL 968238, at *3 (Alaska Ct. App.
July 12, 2000).
378. Id.; see also Am. Nat. Watermattress Corp. v. Manville, 642 P.2d 1330,
1339–40 (Alaska 1982).
379. Herman, 2000 WL 968238, at *3.
380. See Act effective July 17, 1994, ch. 116, § 2, 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws
(current version at ALASKA R. EVID. 404(a)(2)).
381. See Keith v. State, 612 P.2d 977, 984–86 (Alaska 1980).
382. Act effective July 17, 1994, ch. 116, § 2, 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws.
383. § 1.
384. McCracken v. State, 914 P.2d 893, 898 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
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he used was necessary.385 However, specific-act evidence is not
386
admissible to prove the identity of the initial aggressor. This is
true because, under Rules 404(b)(1) and 405(a), evidence of a
person’s specific acts of violence is inadmissible to prove his
387
character for violence.
Obviously, the relevance of specific-act evidence depends on
the defendant’s subjective awareness of the victim’s specific past
conduct. If the defendant was not aware of the victim’s specific
388
acts, those acts could not have affected his decision.
When a defendant testifies that he is aware of the prior
specific bad act, an obvious hearsay issue arises: how did the
defendant become aware of the specific act? In all probability, the
defendant was aware of the act because he was told. Indeed, in
street crime prosecution, testimony that the “word on the street”
was that the victim had committed a particular violent act will
probably implicate multiple layers of hearsay-within-hearsay.
Nonetheless, the prosecutor’s hearsay objection should be
overruled. “When . . . a defendant offers evidence that he or she
had previously heard other people speak of the victim’s violent
acts, this evidence is not ‘hearsay;’ its relevance is not for the truth
of the matters asserted, but rather the effect of these utterances
389
upon the hearer . . . .”
The defendant does not necessarily have to take the stand and
personally testify about his subjective awareness of the victim’s
prior bad act. A defendant could, in theory, call a third-party
witness to testify that he was present when the defendant was told
by another person of the specific bad act. He could also call a
third-party witness to testify that before the confrontation, the
defendant himself explained why he was afraid of the victim. None
of this testimony would be susceptible to a hearsay objection

385. Id. (“[T]he primary relevance of this [specific-act] evidence is to prove the
defendant’s state of mind when he or she used deadly force against the victim—in
particular, the reasonableness of the defendant’s fear that the victim was about to
attack with deadly force.”).
386. See Zuboff v. State, No. A-8692, 2006 Alas. App. LEXIS 189, at *44–56
(Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2006) (noting that the trial judge was “probably” correct
when precluding the defense attorney from arguing that the victim’s prior specific
violent acts could constitute proof of the identity of the initial aggressor). The
author was the trial prosecutor.
387. Id.
388. See Byrd v. State, 626 P.2d 1057, 1059 (Alaska 1980) (“The reason is
obvious: one cannot be fearful because of events about which one knows
nothing.”).
389. McCracken, 914 P.2d at 899.
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because it would not be offered for its truth, but rather to prove the
defendant’s awareness of his victim’s prior violent acts.390
a. McCracken. McCracken v. State is the leading Alaska case
on the admissibility of specific-act evidence to establish the
391
In McCracken, the
defendant’s reasonable use of force.
392
defendant was charged with the murder of Ritchie, his roommate.
Ritchie lived with and provided assistance to McCracken, who was
393
a paraplegic. After an argument about money and housekeeping,
394
McCracken hid a gun beside his leg in his wheelchair. The two
men began to argue again, at which point McCracken pulled out
395
the gun and shot Ritchie.
McCracken took the stand and testified that he shot Ritchie
396
because he thought Ritchie was about to attack him. McCracken
wanted to testify about Ritchie’s violent acts that he had personally
observed, as well as other acts that he did not personally observe,
397
but of which he claimed to be aware. The trial judge ruled that
McCracken could testify about his own observations as well as
398
about Ritchie’s violent reputation. However, the trial judge ruled
that McCracken could not testify to any violent acts about which
399
McCracken had been told by Ritchie or others.
Subsequently, the court of appeals held that this ruling was an
400
error. The court explained that where a defendant claims to be
aware of specific violent acts in his opponent’s past, this is not
401
Rather, it is offered to show that the
“character evidence.”
402
defendant’s resort to force was reasonable. Because evidence of
the victim’s past violence is offered to prove the effect on the
listener (the defendant), and not to prove the truth of whether or
not the victim actually committed the past assault, it is not
403
hearsay.

390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.

See id.
Id. at 897–99.
Id. at 895.
Id. at 894.
Id. at 895.
Id.
Id. at 897.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 897–98.
Id. at 898.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 899.
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The court of appeals explained that the evidence should not be
excluded as hearsay because “[e]vidence that Ritchie had
previously told McCracken about his past acts of violence and
evidence that other people had previously told McCracken about
Ritchie’s violent propensities were just as relevant to the
reasonableness of McCracken’s fear as incidents of Ritchie’s
404
violent behavior that McCracken had personally observed.”
Because the trial judge excluded McCracken’s “most forceful”
evidence supporting his contention that his use of deadly force was
405
reasonable, the court reversed McCracken’s conviction.
b. Inadmissible Evidence. Self-defense litigation will trigger
admissibility of reputation and specific-act evidence that would
probably be inadmissible in other criminal trials. Still, there are
three broad categories of evidence that is inadmissible even in the
self-defense context: (1) specific acts of which the defendant was
unaware, (2) non-violent prior bad acts, and (3) extrinsic specificact evidence offered to impeach a Rule 405 reputation witness.
1) Acts of Which the Defendant was Unaware. A defendant’s
right to admit evidence of his opponent’s specific violent acts is
broad, but not limitless. The first requirement is that the defendant
be aware of the specific act. “[O]ne cannot be fearful because of
406
events about which one knows nothing.” Several cases illustrate
407
this principle.
408
In Grandberry-Williams v. State, as discussed above in Part
IV.E, the defendant spun his wheels in a crowded Anchorage
409
parking lot at closing time, throwing up stones. The victim ran
after the defendant’s vehicle to tell the defendant to stop spinning
410
The defendant got out of his car and spoke briefly
his wheels.
411
As the victim turned away, the defendant
with the victim.
412
punched him, dropping him to the pavement. The victim did not

404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Byrd v. State, 626 P.2d 1057, 1059 (Alaska 1980).
407. See, e.g., Cytanovich v. State, No. A-6287, 1998 WL 80110, at *3 (Alaska
Ct. App. Feb. 25, 1998) (affirming exclusion of specific prior violent acts of which
the defendant was unaware).
408. No. A-8384, 2004 WL 178950 (Alaska Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2004).
409. Id. at *1.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id.
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fight back, but the defendant kicked him in the face several times.413
The trial judge refused to admit evidence of the victim’s history of
bar fights because the defendant was unaware of those prior
414
specific incidents. The court of appeals affirmed, citing Allen and
Rule 405(a): “Rule 405(a) prevents a party presenting a selfdefense claim from offering evidence of specific acts of violence by
the victim to prove the victim’s character for violence unless the
415
defendant knew of those particular acts.”
Where evidence of the opponent’s prior violent acts is
admissible, courts have suggested that the defendant may not offer
416
more detail than he actually knew. In Seek v. State, the defendant
called third-party witnesses to testify in detail about the victim’s
417
Three witnesses gave detailed
prior assaultive conduct.
descriptions of these prior incidents, but “[i]t appear[ed] unlikely
that Seek could have been aware of all of these details; during his
own testimony, Seek never claimed more than a general knowledge
418
Thus, the court of appeals
that the incidents had occurred.”
criticized the admission, saying, “By presenting these three
witnesses, Seek arguably got to present more evidence against
419
Christiansen than he was entitled to. . . .”
2) Non-Violent Prior Bad Acts. Even if a defendant’s
reputation for violence is admissible, his reputation for committing
non-violent crimes is not. Although the distinction between violent
and non-violent acts is often clear, confusion can arise in cases
420
involving drug offenses. Jackson v. State, for instance, suggests
that past instances of selling cocaine do not constitute violent

413. Id.
414. Id. at *4.
415. Id.; see also Rexford v. State, No. A-8539, 2004 WL 2676430 (Alaska Ct.
App. Nov. 24, 2004) (excluding evidence of the victim’s prior assault conviction,
history of fights, and a conviction for breaking a prior boyfriend’s car window
because the defendant was unaware of those prior acts); Johnson v. State, No. A7401, 2004 WL 1886468 (Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2004) (refusing to introduce a
photograph of a rifle inside the victim’s cabin as evidence that the victim was
reaching for a gun because the defendant had not seen the gun, nor had he seen
the victim with any gun for nine years).
416. No. A-6098, 1998 WL 80112 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 25, 1998).
417. Id. at *7. A prosecutor faced with derogatory victim evidence should rely
upon Byrd and Seek, and therefore should request a pre-trial ruling precluding
defense evidence from exceeding the scope of the defendant’s actual knowledge.
418. Id. n.4.
419. Id.
420. 750 P.2d 821 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
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acts.421 In Jackson, the self-defense issue was raised in an
422
ineffective assistance of counsel context. Jackson was convicted
423
Jackson
of murder following a shooting at an after-hours club.
asserted that his counsel was ineffective, in part for failing to
present evidence that the victim had a “reputation as a cocaine
424
The trial judge excluded this evidence, and the ruling
dealer.”
was affirmed because whether the defendant was a cocaine dealer
425
was not “relevant to any issue at trial.”
3) Extrinsic Specific-Act Evidence Offered to Impeach a Rule
405 Reputation Witness. If a party calls a reputation witness to
testify that a participant in the assault is peaceful or violent, the
opposing party may attempt to impeach the witness on cross
examination by inquiring about specific incidents of the victim’s
426
However, “the rule does not provide any basis for
conduct.
427
allowing independent proof of specific incidents.” In other words,
when cross examination regarding specific acts under Allen is
unproductive (and the defendant is subjectively unaware of the
specific act), the lawyer may be stuck with the answer he receives
because the trial court retains significant discretion under Rule 403
428
to exclude extrinsic evidence.

421. Id. at 826.
422. Id. at 823.
423. Id.
424. Id. at 826.
425. Id. The Jackson court further held that any evidence about the victim’s
violent character would not have been admissible to prove the defendant’s state of
mind. Id. It would have been admissible to prove, circumstantially, who may
have been the first aggressor. Id. The court concluded, given other evidence
presented on this point, that Jackson’s attorney was not ineffective for deciding
not to present this cumulative evidence. Id.
426. ALASKA R. EVID. 405(a) (“In all cases in which evidence of character or a
trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to
reputation in any community or group in which the individual habitually
associated or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination,
inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.”).
427. Earl v. State, No. A-7385, 2002 WL 531097, at *9 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr.
10, 2002) (emphasis added). In Earl, the defendant sought to cross-examine a
woman who testified that the stabbing victim had a peaceful character. Id. at *7–
8. The woman had reportedly claimed that the victim had previously assaulted
her. Id. at *8. On cross-examination, the woman denied the assault had occurred,
and Earl sought to introduce evidence from two witnesses that she had previously
claimed the assault had occurred. Id. The judge excluded the evidence, and the
court of appeals affirmed. Id. at *8–10.
428. See id. at *8–10.
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c. Cases Excluding the Victim’s Prior Bad Acts Outside the
Self-Defense Context. The following cases are not self-defense
cases, but rather are “other suspect” cases in which the defendant
claimed a third party was responsible for the crime. They are
useful to illustrate proper exclusion of derogatory-victim evidence
under Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1).
Rule 404(b)(1) excludes evidence of specific acts where the
only purpose of the proof is to demonstrate that the victim acted in
conformance with a derogatory character trait. In Malloy v.
429
State, a murder prosecution, the defense pointed the finger at
430
Rundle, the purported “real killer.” Malloy was charged with a
431
particularly cruel knife killing. The defense offered evidence that
Rundle had assaulted her own son and the family dog in the past
432
with knives. The trial court excluded the evidence, and the court
433
of appeals affirmed the ruling. “[T]he only apparent relevance of
this evidence was to show that Rundle was an assaultive and cruel
person who liked to inflict wounds with knives. Thus, the evidence
434
was barred by Rule 404(b).”
Mere repetition of the same class of crime is also not
435
sufficient. In Jordan v. State, the defendant was on trial for
436
The defense sought to show, but the
felony criminal mischief.
court excluded, evidence that the stolen vehicle passengers who
gave police statements identifying Jordan as the driver themselves
had prior joyriding convictions which would have rendered them
subject to enhanced sentencing had they “truthfully” admitted
437
The court of appeals affirmed, as “‘more is
their own guilt.
demanded than the mere repeated commission of crimes of the
same class, such as burglaries or thefts.’ The bare evidence of
Caldwell’s prior joyriding conviction—all that Jordan offered in

429. 1 P.3d 1266 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 46 P.3d 949
(Alaska 2002) (involving a sentencing issue). The author was the trial prosecutor.
430. Id. at 1279.
431. Id. at 1269.
432. Id. at 1278.
433. Id. at 1278–79.
434. Id. at 1279; see also Smithart v. State, 988 P.2d 583, 590 n.35 (Alaska 1999)
(excluding evidence that a third party “other suspect” had engaged in a
consensual affair with a fifteen year-old girl a year before the defendant was
charged with the murder of another teenage girl).
435. 895 P.2d 994 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
436. Id. at 996.
437. Id. at 997.
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this case—was not relevant to the issue of identity apart from its
tendency to prove propensity.”438
Superficial similarities between two events are insufficient to
439
trigger admissibility. For instance, in Adams v. State, the
defendant was charged with the murder of a man who was tied up,
440
struck on the head, and shot. The defendant wanted to introduce
evidence that the informant who fingered him, who had a prior
441
In that case, the
conviction for robbery, was the real killer.
442
“other suspect” struck the victim on the head. The court ruled
that the similarity between the two crimes was insufficient to
443
“constitute a ‘signature crime.’”
3. Procedural Issues Common to Both Types of DerogatoryVictim Evidence. Regardless of which type of derogatory-victim
evidence the defense offers, the court should exercise reasonable
444
control over its order and presentation. The court of appeals has
affirmed a trial judge who limited the defense counsel’s inquiry
about the victim’s prior violent acts to a pre-approved list of
445
Trial judges should follow this practice and
leading questions.
“script” such questions outside the presence of the jury. This is
essential because a witness, if asked whether he has an opinion
about the victim’s reputation for violence, is likely to volunteer a
specific bad act of which the defendant was unaware. Thus, the
court should instruct the witness about the permissible limits of his
answer outside of the jury’s presence.
Neither specific-act nor derogatory reputation evidence is
admissible until the defendant satisfies the “some evidence” test
446
before the jury. Because both prior specific-act and derogatory
reputation evidence carry the potential for extended testimony
about events distant in time from the charged assault, a prosecutor
should file a pre-trial motion in limine and seek a pre-trial hearing

438. Id. at 999 (quoting VAUGH C. BALL ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 190, at 449 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972) (footnotes omitted)).
439. 704 P.2d 794 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
440. Id. at 795, 798.
441. Id. at 798.
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. ALASKA R. EVID. 611(a) (court control over mode and order of evidence
presentation).
445. Heaps v. State, 30 P.3d 109, 111–12 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
446. See Norris v. State, 857 P.2d 349, 352–53 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
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to obtain a court order excluding such evidence until the defense
satisfies the “some evidence” test before the jury.447
Finally, both types of evidence (derogatory reputation and
448
specific-act) are susceptible to exclusion under Rule 403.
VI. STATUTORY JUSTIFICATION DEFENSES CLOSELY RELATED
TO SELF-DEFENSE
Four statutory justification defenses are closely related to selfdefense. They are: (1) the defense of third persons, (2) the use of
force to terminate a burglary, (3) the use of force against police
officers, and (4) the use of force to make an arrest.

447. An example of a case in which the trial judge refused to admit testimony
of a victim’s prior specific threat against the defendant until the defendant
testified in support of his self-defense claim, and the court of appeals affirmed, is
Forrest v. State, No. A-3952, 1993 WL 13156497, at *3 (Alaska Ct. App. Jan. 13,
1993). On the other hand, it is not difficult to locate instances where a defendant
was allowed to introduce derogatory victim-reputation and specific bad act
evidence, but the court ultimately ruled that the defendant was not entitled to a
self-defense instruction. See Norris, 857 P.2d at 352 (excluding reputation
evidence but allowing the defendant to introduce evidence of the victim’s prior
specific bad acts even though he presented no evidence of self-defense); Loesche
v. State, 620 P.2d 646, 650–51 (Alaska 1980) (permitting derogatory reputation
evidence about the victim, while excluding some specific-act testimony, where the
defendant was not entitled to a self-defense instruction). Both Norris and Loesche
are curious cases, for if the defendant was not entitled to a self-defense
instruction, the court never should have admitted either specific-act or derogatory
opinion evidence at all.
Writing for the 1996 McCracken court, Judge Mannheimer explained the
danger of erroneous admission of derogatory-victim evidence:
The superior court was empowered to place reasonable limitations on
McCracken’s presentation of evidence on this point. A parade of
witnesses all asserting that the victim was a violent or vicious person
might well lead the jurors to reach the conclusion that the victim was
unworthy of the law’s protection, persuading them to base their verdict
on emotion rather than the law.
McCracken v. State, 914 P.2d 893, 899 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996). The first
“reasonable limitation” should be one of timing: the court should make a
threshold finding that the defendant will be entitled to a self-defense instruction
based on evidence presented to the jury before permitting introduction of
derogatory-victim evidence. ALASKA R. EVID. 611(a)(1)–(2) (stating the court
may exercise control over the order of witnesses and presentation of evidence to
ensure ascertainment of the truth and to avoid needless consumption of time).
448. Alaska Rule of Evidence 403 permits the exclusion of concededly relevant
evidence on the grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. Heaps, 30 P.3d
at 112; McCracken, 914 P.2d at 899 (regarding “reasonable limitations”).
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A. Defense of Third Persons
Alaska law provides that a person may be justified in using
force to defend a third person.449 When a defendant claims this
defense, he may use force “when, under the circumstances as [he]
reasonably believes them to be, the third person would be
450
justified” in using that degree of force. This defense is subject to
the same threshold “some evidence” test as would be a defendant’s
451
claim of personal self-defense.
452
In David v. State, the trial judge denied a requested defense453
The defendant testified that he
of-others jury instruction.
believed it was necessary to kick his uncle when he saw him chasing
454
“I thought he was going to do
his six-year old daughter.
something toward my daughter. He was chasing her and she was
455
David presented evidence that his uncle had
pretty scared.”
chased his daughter earlier in the day and that the girl was running
456
457
The child testified she was scared.
The trial
from the uncle.
judge concluded that there was no evidence from which a juror
458
could conclude that harm to the child was possible. The court of
459
appeals disagreed, and reversed David’s conviction.
B. The Use of Force to Terminate a Burglary
Alaska law provides that a person may use non-deadly force to
terminate a criminal trespass and may use deadly force to
460
The statute
terminate a burglary in an occupied building.
imposes no “duty to retreat” upon defendants claiming justification
under this statute. The 1978 statute provided this justification
461
defense only to “persons in control” of premises and their agents,

449. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.340 (1978), amended by Act effective Sept. 13, 2006,
ch. 68, § 4, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws.
450. Id.
451. See supra Part IV.D.
452. 698 P.2d 1233 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
453. Id. at 1235–36.
454. Id. at 1234–35.
455. Id.
456. Id. at 1234.
457. Id. at 1235.
458. Id. at 1236.
459. Id.
460. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.350(c) (1978), amended by Act effective Sept. 13,
2006, ch. 68, §§ 5–6, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws.
461. Act effective 1978, ch. 166, § 10, 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws (codified at
ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.81.330–.335 (2004)).
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but the 2006 legislature expanded this justification defense to their
guests.462
Some defense attorneys have sought to expand the definition
463
of “building,” with intriguing results. In Delolli v. State, the
464
defendant was working as a taxi cab driver. A pedestrian asked
465
The two argued
him to deliver a package, but Delolli refused.
and, according to Delolli’s version of events, the man reached
466
through the open driver’s window of the cab, as if to grab Delolli.
467
Delolli opened the door and pushed him away. The pedestrian
468
469
fell back. Delolli got back into his cab and tried to drive away.
470
As he drove past, the man kicked the cab door sharply. Delolli
stopped the cab, grabbed a sawed-off baseball bat, approached the
471
man, and struck him in the head. At trial, Delolli testified that he
472
He also argued that his use of force was
acted in self-defense.
473
justified to terminate a burglary.
Delolli argued, interestingly, that a vehicle adapted for use as
a place of business (such as a taxi cab) was a “building” within the
meaning of section 11.81.900, and therefore the victim’s reaching
474
through the open window of the cab was a “burglary.” The trial
court instructed the jury on self-defense but denied the instruction
475
The court of appeals
on use of force to terminate a burglary.
appeared to agree that Delolli’s interpretation of the definition of
476
However, because the assault occurred
“building” was correct.
outside the cab and after the victim’s “unlawful burglary” was over,
Delolli was not entitled to an instruction on the use of force to
477
terminate a burglary.

462. Act effective Sept. 13, 2006, ch. 68, § 5, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws.
463. No. A-8263, 2003 WL 22143282 (Alaska Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2003). The
author was the trial prosecutor.
464. Id. at *1.
465. Id.
466. Id.
467. Id.
468. Id.
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. Id.
473. Id. at *5.
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. Id.
477. Id. at *7–8.
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In Palmer v. State,478 Palmer argued with, and then struggled
479
with, a man who had entered his trailer. He eventually stabbed
480
the man. At trial, he argued that the struggle acted as an implied
termination of the victim’s license to be present in the trailer, and
that his use of deadly force to terminate a burglary in an occupied
481
dwelling was therefore authorized by section 11.81.350(c)(2). His
use of deadly force may not have been authorized by section
11.81.335 because the victim was unarmed, and death or serious
482
The court side-stepped the issue,
physical injury was unlikely.
holding that there was no evidence that the defendant directed the
victim to leave the premises, that the victim had threatened the
483
defendant, or that the victim attempted to injure the defendant.
However, the court called the defense theory a “novel
484
argument.” The court also found it significant that the defendant
485
did not testify.
C. The Use of Force Against Police Officers
Defendants charged with assault upon a police officer or
resisting arrest occasionally argue some variant of a self-defense
theme. A citizen may not use force to resist an arrest by a police
officer unless the officer uses excessive force or is unrecognizable
486
as an officer. Nor may a citizen use force to resist a pat-down or
487
Finally, a citizen may not resist an
a lawful investigative stop.
officer’s intrusion into his home to seize property pursuant to court
order, even if there is some reason to believe that that the court
488
decree was issued illegally.
489
In rare cases, such as Barnett v. State, a defendant will argue
that he acted in self-defense against the arresting officer because he

478. 770 P.2d 296 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
479. Id. at 297.
480. Id.
481. Id.
482. See id. at 298.
483. Id.
484. Id.
485. Id.
486. Miller v. State, 462 P.2d 421, 427 n.4 (Alaska 1969).
487. Melson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 60 P.3d 199, 202 (Alaska Ct. App.
2002).
488. Jurco v. State, 825 P.2d 909, 913–14 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992); Napageak v.
State, 729 P.2d 893, 895 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
489. No. A-7785, 2003 WL 77061 (Alaska Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2003). The author
was the trial prosecutor.
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feared physical harm, even though he knew the arrest was lawful.490
Regardless, “generalized fear that excessive force might be used
against him,” coupled with reluctance to be held accountable for
491
his crimes, is insufficient to trigger a self-defense jury instruction.
The defendant in Barnett was caught by a high school security
492
As the
guard stealing car stereos in a high school parking lot.
plain-clothes guard approached aggressively, Barnett jumped in his
493
car. The guard stood in front of the car, and smacked his hand on
494
Barnett
the hood, causing an almost-imperceptible dent.
accelerated directly at the guard, throwing him up and over the car
495
The court of
and then to the ground before speeding away.
appeals held that Barnett was not entitled to use force to resist a
496
“It was only after Judge Souter
non-excessive force arrest.
granted the State’s request to give an instruction that a person had
a right to use nondeadly force to make an arrest that Barnett
suggested that he had a right to use self-defense to avoid Nolan’s
497
The court of appeals
possible use of excessive force on him.”
affirmed the trial judge’s refusal to instruct the jury on self498
defense.
Even in cases where a defendant shows that the force used to
make an arrest is excessive, the reasonableness of the officer’s
499
In these cases,
decision to initiate the arrest is not material.
prosecutors should request, by pre-trial motion, that the court
instruct the jury that the police stop was “lawful.” The prosecutor
should simultaneously file a pre-trial motion to preclude a selfdefense instruction.
490. Id. at *1–2.
491. Id. at *2 (“We fail to see that this generalized fear, with nothing more,
could justify Barnett’s use of a dangerous instrument to resist the arrest.”).
492. Id. at *1.
493. Id.
494. Id.
495. Id.
496. Id. at *2.
497. Id.
498. Id. at *2–3.
499. Jackson v. State, No. A-4382, 1993 WL 13156694, at *5 n.1 (Alaska Ct.
App. May 26, 1993) (“Under these cases [Miller v. State, 462 P.2d 421 (Alaska
1969); Jurco v. State, 825 P.2d 909 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992); Carson v. State, 736
P.2d 356 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987)], use of force to resist the arrest might have been
justified if Jackson established that [Trooper] Jimerfield unreasonably used deadly
force in making the arrest. To the extent Jackson’s defense might have been
predicated on a claim of unreasonable use of deadly force by Jimerfield, however,
the reasonableness of Jimerfield’s initial decision to initiate the arrest would
simply be immaterial.”).
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D. The Use of Force to Make an Arrest
Very rarely, defendants may argue that they used force to
make a “citizen’s” arrest. This implicates a different justification
defense.500 There is a crucial distinction between this justification
defense and personal self-defense. Self-defense requires proof that
501
For a citizen’s arrest,
the defendant faced imminent assault.
however, a person may be entitled to use force to make an arrest
for a crime that has already concluded, where no threat of
502
imminent harm exists.
503
In Barton v. State, the defendant was attacked by assailants
504
505
in his home. He obtained a handgun and his assailants fled. He
506
fired a shot at them as they did so, striking one. The grand jury
507
At
indicted the assailants and Barton in the same indictment.
trial, Barton testified that he shot at the assailants to prevent them
from getting a gun of their own and returning to continue the
508
The trial judge instructed the jury on self-defense, but
assault.
denied a request to instruct the jury on the use of force to make a
509
The court of appeals affirmed because Barton
citizen’s arrest.
testified that he shot the men to terminate the attack, not to make
510
an arrest. Therefore, he was not entitled to an instruction on the
511
law of private arrest. However, the court noted, “[e]ven without
the defendant’s testimony, the facts of a case may support a
reasonable inference that the defendant’s purpose in using force
was to effect an arrest or terminate an escape. If so, then the
512
defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on this defense.”
VII. CONCLUSION
Self-defense is a powerful tool in the hands of the criminal
defense lawyer. It offers a complete justification for all crimes
which prohibit the use of “force” whether the charged offense is
500. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.390 (1978).
501. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.330 (2004), amended by Act effective Sept. 13, 2006,
ch. 68, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws.
502. § 11.81.390.
503. No. A-6971, 1999 WL 189360 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 7, 1999).
504. Id. at *1.
505. Id.
506. Id.
507. Id.
508. Id.
509. Id.
510. Id. at *1–2.
511. Id.
512. Id. at *2.
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misdemeanor assault or first-degree murder. Prosecutors face the
daunting task of disproving self-defense beyond a reasonable
doubt. Often, a legitimate defense threat of an extended case
which “puts the victim on trial” may compel a prosecutor to resolve
a close case with a favorable plea offer.
Every self-defense trial compels both the judge and the
advocates to navigate a complex series of statutes, evidentiary
concepts, and jury instructions. Adding to this complexity, both
the Alaska legislature and the appellate courts have shifted the
self-defense landscape several times in the past decade. Therefore,
when presiding over assault prosecutions where self-defense
concepts are litigated, trial judges should enforce Alaska’s selfdefense notice and pleading requirements. Defense attorneys
should aggressively pursue a course of pre-trial investigation to
uncover derogatory victim reputation and specific-act evidence.
Prosecutors should force a pre-trial hearing regarding the scope of
the defense case by vigorous filing of pre-trial motions in limine.
Finally, both the bench and bar should be familiar with the
concepts discussed and the case law surveyed in this Article.

